PLATO AND TEXTUAL AUTHORITY: AN EXAMINATION OF PLATO'S DOMINATIVE INFLUENCE IN FOUR GENRES OF ETHNOGRAPHY LEADING TO A POSTPLATONIC, RHETORICAL MODEL OF TEXTUAL AUTHORITY

Volume II

A Dissertation

by

JEFFREY BRETT SCHONBERG

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 1992

Major Subject: English

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CHAPTER IV

PLATO, TEXTUAL AUTHORITY, AND FICTIVE ETHNOGRAPHY

"Plato wants to emit. Seed, artificially, technically. That devil of a Socrates holds the syringe. To sow the entire earth, to send the same fertile card to everyone."[1]

Do some attempts to avoid Socrates's "syringe" by ethnographers writing in the 1970's and 1980's succeed? Have any of these attempts avoided Plato's "seed?" If so, the term "postmodern," defined as a renewed interest in "the form and functions of discourse and rhetoric,"[2] has become the sign of anthropology's attempts to move away from Realist and Interpretive/Translative reliance on discursive manipulations as the principal means of authoring texts and authorizing positions of textual authority. The new paths leading from this sign, according to Stephen Tyler, deny

> the discourse of one cultural tradition can analytically encompass the discourse of another cultural tradition. [Thus,] postmodern anthropology refuses both the Hegelian and the scientific fusion of horizons, which reduces all traditions to the shape and interests of Western discourse [by opposing] the semiotic notion that languages and cultures are just conventional

> systems of signs separate from human use and intentionality. . . .[3]

One possible reason anthropologists have chosen these new directions is the emphasis on reflexivity, "the capacity of any system of signification to turn back upon itself, to make itself its own object by referring to itself,"[4] that has dominated the field's notion of itself for the past decade. By posing questions concerning, for example, variations in ritual, participant emotions, and political influences that are unanswerable by the texts developed under Realist or Interpretive/Translative methodologies, some anthropologists have embarked on a Foucaultian journey in which discursive structures are neither "sciences nor . . . scientific disciplines, nor . . . distant prefigurations of the sciences to come, nor . . . forms that exclude any scientificity from the outset."[5] In other words, these explorers of the universe of discourse are beginning to discover that ethnographic texts do not and cannot characterize ethnological knowledge that is itself a product of these texts, that ethnographic texts do not and cannot foretell either their own or their subjects' futures, and that the inscription of ethnographic texts does not and cannot identify discursive elements which are inherently scientific when compared to other choices of composing. Ethnographic texts, then, when seen from this perspective, are "legacies" of the Tower of

Babel, whose myth, according to Jacques Derrida, tells "of the need for figuration, for myth, for tropes, [and] for twists and turns. . . ."[6] More importantly, this view of ethnographic texts denies the assumed relations between hypotactic discourse's derivational focus and Truth and paratactic discourse's focus on the reader's imaginative participation and fiction, thereby prompting a few anthropologists such as Stephen Tyler to call for the development of a poetics of anthropology which celebrates the tropic nature of "reasonable discourse along with the so-called inferential patterns of dialectic and logic."[7]

Kenneth Burke describes a starting point for such a poetics when he notes in his discussion of Poe's "The Philosophy of Composition" that

> when Poe calls Beauty the 'province' of his poem, and says that it is best got by a tone of sadness, or Melancholy, we might say: He is calling for a kind of <u>attitude</u> or <u>sentiment</u> that will be the lyric equivalent of the appeal to the <u>passions</u> in tragic drama proper. Similarly, insofar as tragedy excites to pity, and pity eventuates in tears, we could say that Poe's idea of Beauty in the lyric hovers about this same motive, as when he says: 'Beauty of whatever kind, in its supreme development, invariably excites the sensitive soul to tears. Melancholy is thus the

most legitimate of all the poetic tones.'[8]

A new poetics of ethnography, then, would call for discourse that invokes within a reader an "attitude" that mirrors an ethnography's appeal to, for example, the "passions" surrounding the audience of a ritual performance, the participants in the ritual, and the political influences influencing all of the above as well as the reasonable nature of dialectic which "hovers" over the reader as it moves her from questions to answers, from initial acceptance to acknowledgment of truth. Such discourse would, moreover, merge "subjectivity and objectivity into the undifferentiated cosmic process [wherein] the 'real' is process, the Heraclitian flux rather than the timeless structures of Plato."[9]

A growing number of ethnographers have translated these dictums into texts in which illustrative narration combines with such "literary" devices as characterization, point of view, figurative language, and setting, a combination which, according to some anthropological critics, institutes the concept of the ethnographer as simply another person with a story to tell.[10] All anthropologists, however, have not recognized this direction of ethnography as the solution to the problem of domination in Realist and Interpretive/Translative texts. Instead, by acknowledging the problems inherent in writing itself and by implicitly acknowledging Jacques Derrida's

observation that ". . . the truth inhabits fiction as the master of the house, as the law of the house, as the economy of fiction. The truth executes the economy of fiction, directs, organizes, and makes possible fiction . . . ,"[11] a number of ethnographers overtly recognize the link between hypotactic style and scientific truth, between a theory's explanatory power and reality, and between Platonic method as revealed in his dialogues and ethnography. Ethnographers writing what I call Representative Ethnography, for example, use the cultural practices they study as the supporting data needed to advance their own specific agendas. The goal of Representative ethnographers, therefore, differs from the Realist and Interpretive/Translative goals only in that the Representative ethnographers overtly state their objectives. As a result, Representative ethnography's sense of textual authority relies once again on an objectifying and thus dominative rhetoric that either displaces competing perceptions of a culture or develops a syllogistic examination of oppositions which lead to the premises needed to support the syllogism's conclusion. Moreover, as was true for Realist and Interpretive/Translative textual authority, Representative textual authority increases according to the success the writer has in establishing a domain outside of the studied culture, for it is from this perspective that the ethnographer objectivizes the

participants in the studied cultural practices, reducing them to mere data. Finally, Representative textual authority is reflected by the ability of the ethnographer to control the direction of the text and thus maintain the guise of the single guide capable of leading the reader to the truth. Melford E. Spiro, for instance, states clearly in the introduction to his Oedipus in the Trobriands that his goal is to show that Bronislaw Malinowski's argument that Freud's Oedipus complex may be found only in societies based on Western models is "seriously flawed and its data frustratingly thin."[12] By showing the "flaws" in Malinowski's definition of the Oedipus complex and in his subsequent method of discovering data and by illustrating the "thin" nature of this data, Spiro effectively displaces Malinowski's argument as a serious treatment of Trobriand culture and advances his own Freudian agenda as it applies to cultural description.

According to Spiro, Malinowski's initial flaw lies in his "misunderstanding" Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex. This distortion is seen in Malinowski's treatment of the relationships between the Trobriand boy and his mother and the Trobriand man and his mother. Malinowski claims that the matrilineal complex in the Trobriands focuses hostility not on the father but on the mother's brother, for he, not the father, is the source of all authority. Further, since the Trobriand boy is weaned

from the mother between the ages of two and three, he does not undergo the psychological "wrenching" the forced separation at an earlier age causes in children in Western societies. Moreover, Malinowski claims that no examples exist of the Trobriand man's conscious incestuous feelings for the mother. Spiro notes, however, that the taboo concerning mother-son incest indicates the "boy's sexual attraction to the mother . . . persists into puberty, rather than being dissipated in early childhood."[13] In addition, Spiro alludes to Freud's treatment of mother-son incest, observing that since

> mother-son incest is not expected by Oedipal theory, and since . . . its absence in the Trobriands is duplicated in normal populations in the West, the Trobriand finding can hardly be attributed to the matrilineal 'constitution' of the Trobriand family, nor can it be taken as evidence for the absence of an Oedipus complex.[14]

In this fashion, Spiro displaces Malinowski's treatment of Freudian theory's applicability to anthropological methodology, thereby leaving the Trobriand Islanders open to domination by Spiro's application of Oedipal theory. More important to this study, however, is the building of Spiro's textual authority as it is revealed in the arguments outlined above. The dominative rhetoric characteristic of the Realist and Interpretive/Translative

ethnographies is repeated here, for it is through this rhetoric that Malinowski's perception of Trobriand culture is depicted as a misrepresentation and thus dismissed. Moreover, it is through this rhetoric that the Trobriand Islanders are reduced to mere data useful only in their support for Spiro's theory, for as Spiro notes, Trobriand descriptions of their beliefs and attitudes are important only in that they provide contexts surrounding the "ontogenetic support for our hypothesis that a strong Oedipus complex . . . exists in the Trobriands."[15] As a result, Spiro's sense of textual authority develops from his construction of a domain outside of Trobriand culture and based on Freudian theory from which he can displace Malinowski's arguments, objectify the Trobriand Islanders, and control the direction of the text. Spiro, therefore, maintains his guise of the single authoritive guide capable of leading the reader to a dialectical truth.

Derek Freeman's Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth provides another example of Representative ethnogaphy's overt reliance on Platonic method and textual authority. By perceiving Margaret Mead's work in Samoa as a representation of Franz Boas's involvement in the early twentieth century debates on adolescent behavior, which pitted believers in physiological determinism against believers in cultural determinism, Freeman creates a starting point for a

rhetoric of opposition which allows him to develop a syllogistic examination of Mead's findings. Thus, the Samoans are objectivized as data supporting the premise that Mead's findings were determined early on by "the results of a special inquiry devised by Boas"[16] to show "both eugenics and the racial interpretation of history as irremediably dangerous."[17] When this premise is combined with the premise that Franz Boas, out of a need for a "'scientific and detailed investigation of hereditary and environmental conditions'"[18] to support his own belief in the superiority of cultural determinism, found in Margaret Mead the "spirited young cultural determinist"[19] he needed to carry out his investigation, the proposition's truth that Mead's work represents nothing more than a manipulated confirmation of Boas's a priori assumptions concerning adolescent development is dialectically demonstrated.

More important to this investigation is the sense of textual authority Freeman develops in his treatment of Mead's Samoan experiment. According to Freeman,

> Boas had fully accepted that adolescence, in Europe and the United States, was a difficult period. That this was the case in the United States was also fully recognized by Mead, but, given the 'determinism of culture' in which she had been taught to believe, it might be, she surmised, that in some remote part of the world,

> such as Samoa, things were wholly different. And from this she derived the supposition that 'if a society could be found in which the growing boys and girls missed out on all this storm and stress, then the anthropologist would know . . . that his storm and stress was not inevitable.'[20]

It is apparent here that Mead's interests demand the reduction of the Samoan people to data supporting her research goal. Freeman echoes Mead's objectivizing rhetoric when he claims that his goal is not the construction of

> an alternative ethnography of Samoa. Rather, the evidence [he presents] . . . has the specific purpose of scientifically refuting the proposition that Samoa is a negative instance by demonstrating that the depictions on which Mead based this assertion are, in varying degree, mistaken.[21]

Thus, Freeman's textual authority, as does the textual authority of the Intrepretive/Translative ethnographers, relies on an objectifying rhetoric whose roots are found in Plato's "Phaedo." Moreover, this rhetoric takes the form of oppositions operating at several levels. At one level is the political opposition of physiological determinism and cultural determinism as represented by such signs as biology's "calm scientific investigation [being]

directly linked with racist views like those contained in Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race"[22] and anthropology's humanist interests being directly linked with "a doctrine of absolute cultural determinism that totally excluded biological variables"[23] and such personages as E. B. Tylor (physiological determinism) and Franz Boas (cultural determinism). At a second level is the opposition of the Western societies and "exotic" Samoa as represented by such signs as Western adolescents' "stormy and stressful" situations and Samoa's adolescents' sunny and relaxed situations. Finally, at a third level is the theoretical opposition of Freeman's "more scientific anthropological paradigm"[24] represented by a Hegelian synthesis in which genetic and exogenetic parameters form a theory of human behavior and Mead's paradigm represented by its conclusion that "culture, or nurture, was the absolute determinant of the events of adolescence."[25] Freeman's textual authority, then, develops from his syllogistic investigation of these oppositional representations which lead to the premises described above, which create Freeman's domain outside of the Samoan culture, which guide the direction of the text, and which maintain his guise as the single guide capable of leading the reader to a dialectical truth.

It appears, then, that the ethnographers pursuing what I call Fictive ethnography--that is, ethnographies in which

dialectical representations of observed cultural practices rely explicitly on what has been regarded as techniques of fiction and paratactic styles--exhibit the most significant movement away from the Realist and Interpretive/Translative reliance on Plato's discursive, dialectical manipulations as the principal means of authoring texts and authorizing positions of textual authority. I have, therefore, chosen Jane Kramer's The Last Cowboy and John McPhee's Basin and Range--two examples of Fictive ethnography which John Van Maanen notes are good representatives of the "literary tales" that mark the creative phase currently motivating "presentation[s] of social reality"[26]--as the initial model and copy for my analyses of ethnographies in the Fictive genre. In addition, I include Michael Kunze's Highroad to the Stake: A Tale of Witchcraft--a third representative of the genre that, although published too late for Van Maanen to include in his text, has been used in anthropology courses--to see if this reliance on Platonic method has been avoided. In addition, I have chosen Plato's "Timaeus" as the Platonic dialogue from which to begin this investigation, for within this dialogue, Plato specifically makes use of his dialectic combined with "poetic" language.

Section I

". . . the will to exercise dominant control in society and history has . . . discovered a way to clothe, disguise, rarify, and wrap itself systematically in the language of truth, discipline, rationality, utilitarian value, and knowledge. And this language, in its naturalness, authority, professionalism, assertiveness, and antitheoretical directness, is . . . [dialectical] discourse."[27]

In his attempt to "sow the entire earth," Plato provides in the "Timaeus" a "postcard" on which is written a dialectical description of the creation of the world that is once again based on a syllogistic exploration of oppositions. The soul, as it was in the "Phaedo," is opposed to the body as a metaphor for Plato's distinction between knowledge (represented by the Forms that were initially developed in the "Phaedo") and belief (represented by sensible objects). Moreover, as it was in the "Phaedo," knowledge is characterized by its imperviousness to time and argument, while belief is characterized by its reliance on ever-changing tangibles. The creation of the world thus becomes for Plato a frame within which he may treat his actual concern: developing a methodology for dealing with oppositions that focuses on apprehending

knowledge through collecting examples and dividing them according to specified characteristics. Further, as he did in the "Phaedo," Plato directs not only the character of Socrates but also the characters of Timaeus and Critias, thus providing the reader with a portrait of a displaced Plato who, once again, is unable to attend this social gathering because "he has been taken ill."[28] This portrait, as it was in the previously discussed dialogues, is imperative to Plato's sense of textual authority; by hiding himself behind the discursive weaving that is the dialogue, Plato takes for himself the voices of Socrates, Timaeus, and Critias. Because they are thus unable to respond, the dialogue becomes a monologue, and Plato's is the voice (pen) of authority.

Seen from this perspective, the structure of the "dialogue" consists of an introduction, which strengthens Plato's authority by labeling counterarguments as products of the Sophists and by characterizing Plato's own propositions as stemming from authoritative sources, and two narratives, each having a different though related subject. According to Plato's Socrates, the context for the "dialogue" as it is described in the introductory passages is civil strife: "There are conflicts which all cities undergo, and I should like to hear someone tell of our own city carrying on a struggle against her neighbors. . . ."[29] Thus, the authoritative positions' voices

are those of the holders of high office. Plato's Timaeus is "in wealth and rank the equal of any of his fellow citizens; he has held the most important and honorable offices in his own state, and . . . has scaled the heights of all philosophy."[30] Plato's Critias is "no novice in the matters of which we are speaking,"[31] and Plato's Socrates is, of course, the most powerful voice in the Greek civilization. The voices opposing these authorities are those who

> have plenty of brave words and conceits, but . . . being only wanderers from one city to another, and having never had habitations of their own, they may fail in their conception of philosophers and statesmen and may not know what they do and say in time of war, when they are fighting or holding parley with their enemies.[32]

These are the Sophists, and by labeling their arguments as "sophistry," Plato effectively silences them. What the reader is left with, then, is the monologic authority of Plato, whose subsequent two narratives create the history of the world.

The first of these narratives is Plato's Critias's tale concerning Solon's voyage to Egypt and his discovery of the city and district of Sais, whose inhabitants "are great lovers of the Athenians and say that they are in some way related to them."[33] Solon, while meeting with

one of the city's elder priests, tells the priest about the ancient history of Athens, to which the priest responds, "you [Hellenes] are all young; there is no old opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition, nor any science which is hoary with age."[34] The reason for this lack of belief and knowledge is the cycles of destruction, caused by deluges or fires, which periodically devastate civilization. More importantly, Plato uses this loss to distinguish the opposition between the philosopher's soul that is capable of historicizing knowledge through recalling what it knew prior to its present life and the believer's soul that is capable of understanding only that which is sensible and thus arguable. In addition, the loss of knowledge distinguishes the opposition between the state of grace that surrounded the past's philosophers and the present state of damnation in which believers dangerously outnumber philosophers and thus threaten the very attainability of knowledge. Thus, the priest tells Solon,

> just when you and other nations are beginning to be provided with letters and the other requisites of civilized life, after the usual interval, the stream from heaven, like a pestilence, comes pouring down and leaves only those of you who are destitute of letters and education, and so you have to begin all over again like children, and

> know nothing of what happened in ancient times. . . .[35]

The priest continues with his story, telling Solon of the war between Athens and Atlantis, a conflict won by Athens and marked by a series of violent earthquakes and floods which resulted in Atlantis's sinking into the ocean.

The importance of Plato's Critias's tale to both the remaining narrative concerning the creation of the world and to Plato's textual authority lies in its development of the motifs of cyles and the importance of writing and in its description of the position of importance Athens holds in civilization. The motif of cycles ties the first narrative to the second, for the cycles play a large part in Plato's Timaeus's description of the creation of the soul and body of the universe. The motif of the importance of writing allows Plato to return to a device used in the "Meno" and the "Phaedo"; by playing what Jasper Neel calls "the role of recording secretary"[36] for the characters in the dialogue, Plato reinforces his textual authority. Disputing Critias, whose tale is a repetition of the one Solon told to Critias's great-grandfather, who in turn told it to Critias's grandfather, who passed it on to Critias, is difficult since Critias is the sole surviving member of the family and since, at the time of the dialogue's writing, Critias, as well as Solon, is dead. A similar situation holds for Socrates. When Plato wrote

the dialogue, Socrates had been dead for some time. Thus, as he did in the "Meno" and the "Phaedo," Plato uses writing, the only means by which he may manipulate time and sequence, to textualize his sense of authority. Moreover, as the only living heir to the Athenian position of, according to the Egyptian priest, conqueror of imperialist Atlantis and thus of liberator of the world, Plato is the sole guide capable of recalling this heritage and making use of its knowledge.

Plato's Critias's tale of "not only the general heads, but the particulars, as they were told to [him],"[37] however, must wait for another time. His story of man's development must follow Plato's Timaeus's tale of the "generation of the world and . . . the creation of man."[38] The cycle motif is thus enlarged to a textual structure, thereby making coherent the two narratives.

Plato's Timaeus's narrative begins with a revocation of the opposition between the philosopher and the simple believer:

> we must make a distinction and ask, What is that which always is and has no becoming [Being], and what is that which is always [B]ecoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state, but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a

> process of becoming and perishing and never really is.[39]

Re-emphasizing the opposition between knowledge and belief creates yet another aspect of coherence between the first and second narratives. More importantly, it reifies the Platonic method of representing oppositions, in this case through a rhetoric of cycles, as a means of dialectically developing premises needed to support a proposition. In other words, "Being" and "Becoming" represent two opposing realms. The former includes the eternal and the unchanging which are made understandable through Plato's dialectical reasoning, while the latter includes the mortal and the inconsistent which are made understandable through belief and argument. In addition, "Being" and "Becoming" are the dividing concepts Plato attaches to philosophers and sophists, an opposition represented by a cycle of creation:

> was the world . . . always in existence and without beginning, or created, and had it a beginning? Created . . . visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible, and all sensible things are apprehended by opinion and sense, and are in a process of creation and created.[40]

The result of this opposition strengthens Plato's Socrates's initial description of Plato's Timaeus as having

"scaled the heights of all philosophy,"[41] for as the philosopher only he can deal with Being. Moreover, the opposition further displaces a sophistic counterargument; since the sophist can deal only with the Becoming, the arguments concerned with Being are reserved for the philosopher. Finally, when the reader remembers that Timaeus is Plato's Timaeus, Plato's self-portrayal as the single guide capable of leading the reader to truth becomes clearer; Plato the writer knows what is to come, for he is the historicizer, the controller, the wielder of the signifying finger.

Despite its attachment to belief and argument, Plato's Timaeus describes the "Becoming" world as "good," for the creator, being free from jealousy, "desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be."[42] More specifically, since those things that are "Becoming" reflect the eternal and unchanging aspects of the reasonable creator, this realm reflects the orderliness of God. Plato's Timaeus thus states that when God found his creation to be disorderly, he "brought order, considering that his was in every way better than the other."[43] It is this orderliness which makes important the reminder that this depiction of the creation of the world is based on the "testimony of wise men"[44] and the observation that the creation of the world described here illuminates the soul-body hierarchy underlying the creation. Couched in a

metaphor of the human artist, God, "when he was framing the universe . . . put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best."[45] The unspecified "wise men" highlight Plato's method of creating history, and by grounding his soul-body hierarchy in the wise men's "testimony," Plato textually validates his authority. Moreover, by hierarchically opposing the soul and the body, Plato's Timaeus can use the world (body) as a visible image of the creator (soul), a metaphorical link extended by his viewing the world as an organic product of creation: "we may say that the world came into being--a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God."[46] Thus, the basis for a premise stating the philosopher's duty is to discover eternal, unchanging Truth and supporting Plato's Timaeus's proposition that a methodology based on collecting and opposing in order to define and classify is dialectically true is discovered through syllogistically examining the opposition implied in the cyclical rhetoric on the world's creation. This basis is further developed in Plato's Timaeus's discussion of models and copies:

> Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? There must be one only if the created copy is to accord with the original. For that which includes all other

> intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in that case there would be need of another living being which would include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included them.[47]

More specifically, the metaphorical link between a model and its copy reveals the relationship between the world (body) and the creator (soul). The soul exists in the body, just as the spirit of the model exists in the copy. As a result, an interpretation of the orderliness of the body or copy in terms of the orderliness of the soul or model is necessarily true. The premise thus develops that the philosopher in search of knowledge must regard the soul as the source of knowledge. Plato's Timaeus, therefore, can conclude that since the world is a sensible reflection of that soul, the philosopher must make use of a method which defines and classifies the visible aspects of the world in terms of the eternal, unchanging, orderly soul to apprehend knowledge. This conclusion is empowered through its actualization in Plato's Tiamaeus's distinction between the philosopher and the simple believer:

> The sight . . . is the source of the greatest benefit to [philosophers], for had we never seen the stars and the sun and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe

> would ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years have created . . . the power of inquiring about the nature of the universe. And from this source we have derived philosophy. . . . God invented and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence . . . [so that we might] imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries.[48]

It is, in addition, obvious that since Plato's voice is the sole representer of philosophy, it is his voice and method that are authoritative.

Plato's Timaeus's reliance on metaphor throughout this syllogistic investigation indicates an importance beyond that of coherence, for he notes that when the creator was finished with the world, he resolved to "make the copy still more like the original"[49] by creating an "image of eternity . . . moving according to number . . . [that] we call time."[50] Truth, nonetheless, exists outside of time, for it is Being rather than Becoming. Thus, "'is' alone is properly attributed to [Being], and 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of [B]ecoming."[51] These terms, however, are "inaccurate modes of expression,"[52] and since time is used as an "image of eternity," or Truth, only

metaphorical language, the language of images, can accurately express Being.

Such a use of metaphor allows Plato to accomplish several objectives. First, it permits Plato to represent his written monologue as dialectical thought. Second, the use of metaphor offers Plato another means of controlling the direction of his text. As Jacques Derrida notes, metaphor "orients research and fixes results."[53] Third, Kenneth Burke's discussion of terministic screens includes his observation that "within a field there can be different screens, each with its ways of directing the attention and shaping the range of observations implicit in the given terminology,"[54] an allusion to the fact that a metaphor can only be countered by another metaphor. Yet, since Plato has labeled all other metaphors as sophistry, his metaphors retain their authoritative stance, despite their attachment to the sensible world of belief and argumentation. Having been met, these objectives allow Plato to secure his position as the wielder of the enscribing finger, for as the singular master of both dialectic and metaphorical language, only he can guide the reader to truth through method and images.

Using this initial analysis of the "Timaeus" as a starting point for examining the Platonic dialogue's continued influence on Fictive ethnography's textual authority allows two hypotheses to develop. If this

genre's texts reveal the same ideological and hegemonic characteristics identified in the "Timaeus," Jacques Derrida's portrait of Plato's relationship with Socrates will continue to metaphorically represent the relationship between Plato and the ethnographer and between the ethnographer and his or her object of study. Moreover, if the relationship between Plato and the ethnographer is maintained, the relationship between the monological dialogue and the ethnographic text will be maintained; the "copy" will reproduce the soul of the "model." An analysis of the texts typifying the Fictive genre as identified and defined earlier will indicate the accuracy of these hypotheses.

Section II

"I listened at the time with childlike interest to the old man's narrative; he was very ready to teach me, and I asked him again and again to repeat his words, so that, like an indelible picture, they were branded into my mind."[55]

Much as Plato uses Critias's tale of the ancient Hellenes to historicize his depiction of the creation of the world, Jane Kramer uses the myth of the American Old West to historicize her depiction of the world of the contemporary cowboy, the focus of her study, The Last Cowboy. Further,

like Plato's Critias, who listens to his "informant's" words until "they [are] branded into [his] mind," Kramer listens to her informant, Henry Blanton, "branding" his words into the "stack of notebooks, getting bigger every day, on the bench by the kitchen door at the Willow Ranch headquarters."[56] The similarities between the two texts continue. Solon, during a journey to mysterious Egypt in search of information concerning "antiquity,"[57] discovers an elder priest who proceeds to tell him a portion of the lost history of the Hellenes. Similarly, Kramer, during a journey to the mysterious Texas Panhandle (mysterious in that its symbols, the "calf cradle, fence-mending tools, mesquite trees and cactus flowers . . . [and the correct] boots,"[58] like Egypt's pyramids and temples, represent to Kramer a locale as exotic as Egypt is to Plato), in search of information concerning "the most 'American' thing [she] could think of,"[59] discovers Henry Blanton, who proceeds to tell her about a cowboy's life. In addition, Solon approaches the priest with an attitude configured by myths concerning the glorious history of the Hellenes, a history represented by larger-than-life figures: "[Solon] began to tell about . . . Phoroneus, who is called 'the first man,' and about Niobe, and after the Deluge, of the survival of Deucalion and Pyrrha, and he traced the genealogy of their descendents. . . ."[60] Similarly, Kramer approaches Henry Blanton with an attitude configured by a myth

concerning the glorious life of the cowboy, a life represented by an association of cowboys with "high adventure and the promise and challenge and freedom of a continent."[61] But by far the most important similarity between Kramer and Plato is Kramer's reliance on Plato's dialectical method of using a syllogistic investigation of oppositions, which leads to premises needed to support a proposition. While the propositions themselves are different, the ultimate goals are the same. Plato uses Solon's tale to support a depiction of a fallen society (in the words of the Egyptian priest, a "young" society)[62] whose decline represents the opposition between the philosopher's perception of the soul and the believer's perception of sensibles, while Kramer historicizes Henry Blanton's tale to support a depiction of a myth-controlled cowboy culture. Blanton's words focus on a life that can be settled into yet not settled for, a life of "deep, prideful disappointment"[63] spent searching for a mythical restoration yet dominated by "the memory of his father's and grandfather's cowboy lives."[64] He therefore is placed in the position of Plato's believers and thus becomes representative of the opposition between the philosopher's (ethnographer's) perception of the soul (myth) and the believer's (informant's) perception of sensibles. Such a method of arriving at a mythical image through a dialectical movement beyond sensibles to the realm of theory,

according to Kenneth Burke, reveals the method's ideological basis; the rhetoric of transcendence which marks Plato's and Kramer's method is "necessarily partial [in that] whatever its claims to universal validity, its 'principles' favor the interests of some group more than others."[65] In Kramer's case, the "favored group" is Kramer's acquired Platonic role of recording secretary for her characters so that she may uncover myth. As a result, Henry Blanton's ability to dispute Kramer's observations is difficult, for his voice is hegemonized by Kramer's, leaving Kramer's as the voice (pen) of authority. Thus, Kramer, like Plato, uses writing to textualize her authority. Moreover, as the only "philosopher" in a textual world inhabited by believers, Kramer is the sole guide capable of dialectically leading the reader to the truth inherent in her mythic image of the contemporary American cowboy. Initially, then, the two hypotheses described above appear to be born out. The first portion of Kramer's text reveals the same dominative characteristics identified in Plato's "Timaeus." Derrida's portrait of Plato's relationship with Socrates thus metamorphizes, allowing Socrates's features to take on those of Kramer. Further evolution of Derrida's portrait, following the above investigation of Kramer's text, shows Plato's face changing to Kramer's, while Socrates's persona dons a cowboy hat, boots, and work clothes. In light of this

apparent confirmation of the first hypothesis, the first portion of Kramer's text appears to similarly validate the second hypothesis. The monologic ethnography which is the product of the dialogues recorded in Kramer's "stack of notebooks" reproduces the soul of the Platonic model of textual authority. An examination of the rest of Kramer's text will indicate the continued strength of the hypotheses.

Kramer uses the Platonic combination of figurative language and dialectic to invoke Plato's notion of time as an image of Truth and to weld that sense of Truth with her proposition that a myth's domination of a culture results in its members feeling the contradictory emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope and thus seeing their lives as being both futile and proud. The resulting rhetoric of opposition creates a world whose twentieth-century inhabitants have fallen from the grace represented by the myth of the ninteenth-century Old West to a state marked by "treachery and promise":

> Henry Blanton turned forty on an April day when the first warm winds of spring crossed the Texas Panhandle and the diamondback rattlers, fresh and venomous from their winter sleep, came slipping out from under the cap rock of the Canadian River breaks. It was . . . the kind of day that Henry would have expected for the showdown in a good

> Western. Henry was particular about Westerns. . . . [For when he was a boy] Henry braved the moaning ghosts who rode the river breeze past the old stone line camp where he slept alone . . . by fixing his thoughts on calm, courageous movie cowboys [such as] John Wayne, Gary Cooper, and Glenn Ford.[66]

Kramer's Blanton, however, is not "particular" about his father, who "once had been as fine a cowboy as any man in the Panhandle," or his grandfather, who "had made the long cattle drive to Wyoming . . . when Indians were still marauding and a rustler . . . would as often as not shoot a trail boss . . . looking for his strays."[67] In other words, Henry Blanton is a member of a culture whose dominant myth both motivates and frustrates the lives of its members. Thus, the "first warm winds of spring" hold the potential opportunity of becoming the "calm, courageous" mythical hero represented by "John Wayne, Gary Cooper, and Glenn Ford," but also hold the potential opportunity of meeting the "venomous rattlers" represented by Blanton's father and grandfather. Yet, since Blanton exists in a fallen state, a position marked by his loss of "'expressin' right'", the mythic quality which includes "the kind of quiet certainty that sustained a man when times were bad,"[68] the greater probability lies in meeting with the diamondbacks.

The similarity between Kramer's opening paragraphs and the beginnings of Plato's Critias's and Plato's Timaeus's narratives emphasizes the relationship Plato describes between the model and the copy; one shares the soul of the other. More specifically, Kramer's beginning description of Henry Blanton evokes Plato's Critias's opposition between grace and damnation, between knowledge and belief, between the philosopher and the believer. Once again, the image of a world that has fallen into nothing but belief due to the inhabitants' loss of both knowledge and the appropriate means of rediscovering that knowledge dominates Kramer's depiction of Blanton. In addition, Kramer's beginning creates an opposition between the ethnographer and her informant which mirrors Plato's oppositions. The inscripting ethnographer can historicize the informant's words through a created context inaccessible to the informant's perceptions of the sensibles which make up his world just as Plato's Critias can historicize knowledge unattainable to his ancestors or Solon.

Kramer continues her description of Blanton the believer by focusing his means of measuring himself against others on sensibles. He is "the foreman of ninety thousand acres . . . [and is] a good rider and a fine roper."[69] Moreover, he can

> pull a calf with considerable skill, and when he ha[s] to he [can] cut a dogie from the belly of

> its dying mother. He [can] account for every one of the twenty-two hundred cows in his charge . . . and [knows] which cows [deliver] strong, healthy calves each spring, which cows [need] help calving, [and] which ones [tend] to miss a year or deliver stillborn. He [knows] . . . when a fence [is] down or [when] a pole [is rotten]. He [can] put his ear to the pump pipe of a windmill well that [is] drawing poorly and tell in minutes whether the checks [are] broken or the water, three hundred and fifty feet underground, [is] drying up.[70]

Nevertheless, because his measure is based on these sensibles, Blanton is not "the sort of cowboy who inspire[s] admiration or respect."[71] The symbols on which he places so much meaning are representations of "Becoming," the realm of faulty information Plato's Timaeus associates with the mortal and the inconsistent. Blanton, therefore, remains trapped in a snare of ignorance; not only has he, like most of the Hellenes, lost both the means of attaining knowledge and the understanding of what knowledge is, he also "does not know why and [is] ashamed of himself anyway for wondering."[72]

This feeling of entrapment manifests itself in Blanton's restlessness and lack of control. He cannot "manage that economy of gesture and person which [is] appropriate

in a cowboy,"[73] he drinks too much during the brief periods of time he spends in town, and while working he keeps "a bottle of bourbon in his Ford pickup truck and another in his saddlebag."[74] Further, the younger Blanton's penchant for practical jokes has turned into the older Blanton's "ugly and immodest" attitude toward his wife Betsy, his daughter Melinda, and the cows and horses under his care.[75] Blanton prides himself, most frequently in diatribes aimed at Betsy or Melinda's requests for money, on having left behind the camps "where Betsy had to cart water from a spring to do the dishes or wash her babies' diapers . . . [and where] even the best cowboy was worth no more to his boss than a hundred and fifty dollars a month in wages, a shack for a home, and the meat from steers that were too scrawny to send to auction."[76] Since he became foreman, his family now lives in a "prefabricated house with electricity and a telephone and running water--a house with a highway only twelve miles away down a negotiable dirt road."[77] And, Kramer reports that Blanton's neighbors believe that Blanton "move[s] his cows a little too fast for their placidity, [drives] his yearlings a little too fast for their daily gain . . . forget[s] to keep his knife sharpened [while working cattle] . . . [and when] dehorning, he saw[s] too deep into a calf's horns, [turning] the creature's lowing . . . mad with pain."[78]

Kramer's portrayal of Henry Blanton concludes with a return to the source of his beliefs about what a cowboy should be. Kramer states that western movies show Blanton that "a good cowboy [is] a hero . . . [who] live[s] by codes, not rules--codes of calm, solitude, and honor."[79] Moreover, these movies imply that "a cowboy ha[s] a special arrangement with nature" that allows him to know "a truth and a freedom and a satisfaction that ordinary men did not."[80] When Blanton examines his life according to these "codes" and the "truth, freedom, and satisfaction" which derive from them, however, he finds himself watching a cycle of change from a static position. His situation thus illustrates the growing chasm that separates him and his ideal and which separates "Being" and "Becoming," the philosopher and the believer, the soul and the body, and the ethnographer and her informant. The circuit preacher, who affirms Blanton's belief that "a man on a horse surely ha[s] a head start in the business of grace over Communists and New Yorkers," visits less frequently because he is now making money by "giving I.Q. tests to the Baptists on his route for a rich Bible college that was running a study called God and Intellect."[81] The ranch owner has moved to London, and his orders to Blanton come through "a college-boy ranch manager who [knows] more about juggling account books than raising cattle and [who, because he is afraid of the cattle, does] most of his managing from the

driver's seat of a locked, air-conditioned Buick."[82] Powerless believer that he is, Henry Blanton cannot participate in the cycle. He therefore condemns the changes as the results of "malice and greed . . . [and] despair,"[83] the characteristics of codes antithetical to those of the cowboy. Even so, Kramer notes that Blanton bleakly observes that he has nothing more to show for his life than "a hand-tooled saddle and a few horses."[84] His birthday cake has lost its meaning because Betsy is not speaking to him, Melinda has used all the hot water in her preparations for school, he is hungover, and his West is "full of fences and feedyards," is populated by college-educated "calf traders and futures brokers," and is dominated by "ranchers who [commute] from London or the South of France."[85] More importantly, the oppositions represented by Blanton's situation, when examined syllogistically, form premises which support Kramer's proposition concerning the effects of a dominant myth on a culture. Henry Blanton, the cowboy culture's representative, believes deeply in a myth of the Old West and feels the contradictory emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope. He sees his life as being both futile and proud. Moreover, Blanton sees his life as static; there is "not much chance [given the above situation] for a hero on a horse."[86] In addition, when the reader remembers that this Blanton, like Timaeus, is the product of his

controlling author, Kramer's portrayal of her role as Blanton's recording secretary becomes the portrait of the single guide capable of leading the reader to truth. Kramer, the writer of ethnography, knows what is to come, for she is the controller, the wielder of the signifying finger. Her job, however, is not finished, for like Plato she must support her position of authority. Kramer thus grounds her Old West myth in a narrative of the nineteenth-century West, much as Plato's Timaeus grounds his narrative on the creation of the world in the testimony of wise elders and in Plato's Critias's tale.

By interspersing illustrative narratives between segments whose flavor reflects James Kinneavy's definition of literary discourse, Kramer creates an application of Stephen Tyler's combination of tropeical discourse and dialectic, thus bringing her text into acceptable (by some) ethnographic form. But more importantly, Kramer's insertion of illustrative narrative allows for the historicization she needs to maintain the power of her dominative myth. Just as Plato's Timaeus refers to "wise men" to ground his explanation of the creation of the world, Kramer predicates her myth of the Old West on the writings of Owen Wister and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Thus the nineteenth-century cowboy becomes the spirit of the "Virginian, riding west . . . to shoot straight, with a noble and virtuous heart, and kill his villain,"[87] melded with

Emile's character of the natural man, who is "set . . . against outlaws and spoilers, card sharks and Comanches" and who, when measured against the Easterners, "[shows] them up, with his solemn, masculine behavior, as weak men and petty moralists."[88] And, Kramer notes, these images were psychologically necessary to "a people determined to expand across the continent and profit from it,"[89] for they helped develop in these people the mental framework necessary for their quick domination of a land inhabited by competitors. But the images do not include the "real" cowboys of the nineteenth century, the

> range bums and drifters and failed outlaws, freed slaves and impoverished half-breeds, ruined framers from the Reconstruction South and the tough, wild boys from all over who were the frontier's dropouts, boys who had no appetite for the ties of land or family, who could make a four-month cattle drive across a thousand miles and not be missed by anyone.[90]

What the myth does for these individuals, according to Kramer, is take "the edge off their frightful lawlessness and [make] a virtue of their old failures."[91] Thus, Henry Blanton's grandfather, the man who "lost [his] five slaves to the Thirteenth Amendment and [his] Georgia hog farm to carpetbaggers,"[92] moved west to partake in his portion of the myth by becoming one of the "tough, wild boys from all

over." Grandfather Blanton, however, was one of the majority of people whose lives did not match the myth; he was simply one of the cowboys who "could run a few steers on [his] rancher['s] land along with the ranch cattle, put the profit from those steers toward a couple of section, and talk about becoming [a rancher himself]."[93]

The grandfather thus becomes a symbol with multiple meanings for both Henry Blanton and Kramer's reader. To Blanton, the grandfather represents both the success and the failure of the cowboy myth, for although he was part of the key mythemes of the cowboy myth--he lost everything to post-Civil War Reconstruction, made the long trip from Georgia to Texas, and was a participant in the trail drive--he did not achieve the status of Wister's Virginian. Instead, he ended his life with not much more to show for his life than Henry has. Henry's contradictory emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope stem from this image of success and failure. To Kramer's reader, the grandfather represents the success of Kramer's historicizing process. Through her use of him as an illustration bridging the myth of the cowboy as written by Wister and Rousseau and her own history of the nineteenth-century West, he becomes a visible reflection of her dialectic. In addition, by using the grandfather as an image of the distinction between Kramer's knowledge and Blanton's belief, the reader can see Kramer's

hierarchical opposition which allows her proposition that a myth's domination of a culture results in contradictory emotions to control the depiction of Henry Blanton and which echoes Plato's Timaeus's description of the dominance of the soul over the body: God "made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject."[94] The grandfather is as much a creation of Kramer's as Henry Blanton is. Thus, as the only person in the text capable of assuming the role of creator, Kramer is the only soul capable of "ruling" the body of Henry Blanton. Kramer's hierarchical ordering of Blanton and his grandfather, therefore, textualizes her authority.

The remainder of Kramer's text reinforces her dialectical drawing of Henry Blanton as a historicized representative of a culture dominated by a myth. In the spirit of the Virginian, he carries a Winchester, racked prominently in his pickup's rear window, believing that "hiding weapons was low and cowardly [and] that a man's right to arm himself against villainy was something sacred. . . ."[95] As a means of maintaining his "special arrangement with nature" and his belief in the cowboy myth, Blanton adds sixty feet to his sheet-metal barn while still maintaining his view from the house's courtyard of the

> little hill with its grove of hackberries and cottonwoods . . . the solitary willow by the

> well . . . the pasture where his horses graze . . . the wooden pens . . . where the milk cows and the dogies fed from troughs . . . [and] the old chuck wagon that [Grandfather] Blanton once used on roundups.[96]

Kramer emphasizes the symbolic power of the old wagon for both Blanton's myth-controlled existence and her own proposition concerning cultures dominated by myths by noting that although Betsy enjoys the evening view of the ranch's land from a perch on one of the cattle pens, she cannot get Henry to join her; instead, he spends his evenings sitting in "the driver's seat of his Granddaddy Abel's chuck wagon, which he kept parked under the willow tree."[97] Kramer extends her emphasis on this symbolic value to Blanton in her description of Blanton's reason for reclaiming the wagon from the ranch for which his grandfather worked when the ranch was sold and in Blanton's subsequent use of the wagon. After being stopped by a state trooper for driving with a bottle of bourbon in his hand, Kramer explains that Blanton's excuse was that "he was hauling his granddaddy's chuck wagon home to the family . . . so that no son-of-a-bitch corporation college boys would ever get the opportunity to pretty it up like a dude-ranch buggy."[98] Moreover, after he repairs the wagon, Kramer states that Blanton insists on using it during roundups, demanding that "his hands and all the

neighbors who would be helping . . . sleep [on the ground around the wagon] under the stars, the way cowboys used to do. . . ."[99] Finally, Kramer extends the wagon's symbolic value to her proposition by noting that when Blanton, while hauling the wagon back to his ranch, was stopped by the state trooper who wanted Blanton to accompany him to town for a breath analysis, Blanton's bourbon-tinged explanation was accepted "repentedly" by the trooper. As another member of the myth-dominated culture, the trooper understands Blanton's motivation. For as representatives of the mythical animosity between lawmen and cowboys, they share the burden placed on them by the Old West myth. Thus, the trooper and Blanton can sit together "in the Ford pickup on the hot, dusty day . . . Henry brought his grandfather's chuck wagon home, [sharing] a momentary truce [and] mourning the West that was supposed to be."[100]

In addition to the wagon, Kramer describes Henry Blanton's clothing as tying him to his domineering myth. Dressed in black boots, jeans, hat and jacket, a style described to Blanton as favored by the Virginian and which Blanton saw worn by Gary Cooper in "High Noon" and thus chosen as Blanton's working uniform, he hurries through breakfast "so that he [can] greet his men with the day's orders looking relaxed and confident."[101] And, just as she earlier showed the chuck wagon's symbolic value by placing it as the focal point at which the opposed rules

of the highway and the cowboy code conflict, Kramer shows Blanton's clothing's symbolic value by using his clothes as the point at which the opposed rules created by economic necessity and the cowboy's codes conflict. Because the ranch takes care of "everything [the Blantons need] except a decent income" and because ranch owners assume that "cowboys take better care of their own property than somebody else's,"[102] the costs of Henry's clothing, along with ranch gear, groceries, and the general needs of the Blanton family, far exceed Henry's monthly paycheck. Thus, Betsy takes a job as an invoice clerk in a grain dealer's warehouse. The image of the working wife, however, violates the cowboy code represented by Henry's clothing, and the anger that derives from the code's desecration drives Henry to confront the man who offered Betsy the job. Kramer describes Henry's dramatic scene as an "eloquent" defense of the code. The cowboy's wife has a

> duty to her husband and to the ranch that [pays] him. [Further,] a foreman's house [is] a kind of command post, and a foreman's wife [is] . . . the general's secretary whose job it [is] to stay at that post taking messages, relaying messages, keeping track of everybody on the ranch, sending help in an emergency.[103]

Unlike the trooper, the grain dealer is not a member of

the cowboy culture. He is a businessman, a participant in another myth. He is, therefore, adamant about Betsy's employment. She is, after all, "a respectable woman--not like one of those town women, with their false eyelashes and skimpy skirts."[104] Thus, the cycle of change that finds its expression in economic images and that began with the ranch owner's move to London opposes Henry Blanton's static myth once again. This time, however, the myth loses; Betsy keeps her job, and her employer allows her to stay home on the days Henry works cattle. Nonetheless, the myth demands a price be exacted for this loss, a remuneration seen in the decline of Henry's and Betsy's relationship. The "prettiest girl in her class at the district high school" takes on a stressed "tightness" that causes her face to harden "under the bright, careful pouf of hair that her hairdresser said was just the thing for softening the features of tall, thin women."[105] Henry, dressed in black and following an evening meal eaten too quickly, either retreats "to the parlor with a copy of TV Guide, looking for a Western to watch on television"[106] or, in the company of his brother, Tom, makes his way to a bar in town. On the days the cowboy myth's dominance over Henry is particularly strong, a day like his fortieth birthday, trouble ensues. On this occasion, a fight between Henry and Tom and "two long-haired strangers dressed in boots and hats and flashy Western suits"[107]

results in Henry's receiving bruises and a swollen eye and in Tom's being stabbed by a knife and cut by broken glass from the glass door through which he fell. Thus appeased, the myth impels Henry to seek its graces in the ranch headquarters belonging to John Robinson, a neighboring rancher and a man Henry admires because John is "the nearest thing [Henry knows] to the old cattle barons in the movies that he liked so much--someone on the order of . . . John Wayne in 'McClintock.'"[108]

Kramer uses the character of Sam Otis, "an old cowpuncher who had lived and worked on a neighboring ranch for so many years that people long ago . . . began [calling it] 'Sam's place,'"[109] as she uses the character of the state trooper: both men are additional members of the cowboy culture dominated by the cowboy myth. But where the flat character of the state trooper simply mirrors the myth's control over Henry Blanton, Kramer's characterization of Sam allows him to function in the same manner as Plato's Critias's Solon. Plato uses the long-dead Solon as a historical source who authorizes Plato's fallen society by fulfilling the role of the Hellenic philosopher in search of the knowledge residing in the ancient Egyptian metaphor Plato uses to represent the soul of Hellenic Greece. Similarly, Kramer uses Sam Otis as a historicized source who authorizes her myth and its opposed cycle of change. Sam's perspective of the cowboy myth sees its

opposition by the cycle of change as beginning with the economic images he associates with Franklin Roosevelt's presidency:

> 'You know when it all began to change?' Sam said. 'It was when that Roosevelt fella got in. . . . That was the end--that P.W.A., or whatever they call it. Boy, I'd of died before I got on one of them welfare things. Your old cowpuncher--he's got a little pride. He don't want no one taking care of him.'[110]

It is Sam's condemnation of "welfare things" as "not Western" which provides Kramer with a historically grounded sense of time through which the reader may see the cowboy myth as the soul whose lost knowledge separates the fallen generation of cowboys from those represented by John Wayne and Gary Cooper. Henry Blanton's response to Sam's indignation clarifies this perception:

> 'Seems to me like we been kind of breaking nature's law,' [Henry] said. . . . 'I mean, the law of nature is for the strongest to survive, ain't it? But here we kind of take care of the weakest. Now, don't get me wrong. I don't mind the weakest. I mind the ones with no ambition. Them old cowpunchers in the movies--they got what they wanted 'cause of ambition. Else they worked for somebody who knew how to use them. You got

to see old Chill Wills in "The Rounders" to know what those old cattlemen were really like.'[111]

It is this code of "taking care of the weakest" that forms the "comfortable and generous" relationship between Henry and Pepper, the nine-year-old Appaloosa that "command[ed] Henry's tenderness and humor"[112] and which prompts Henry and the other cowboys to help George Smith, an elderly cowboy in his seventies who "had come up in the world the right way--starting as a cowboy, working hard and saving money and, finally, leasing some land . . . and filling that land with a fine small herd of cattle"[113] and who is now physically unable to work his cattle. More importantly, it is this application of this code of the cowboy myth that allows Kramer to echo a Platonic device which specifically characterizes her text as a "copy" of Plato's "model." A farmer needing help plowing a field calls George, asking for the name of an "old cowpuncher . . . who'd like to make himself a little money."[114] The farmer, however, is not deserving of the assistance Blanton gives George, for Kramer's depiction of farmers and ranchers, like Plato's sophists and philosophers, hierarchically represents the opposition between the cycle of change and the cowboy myth. Farmers, according to Blanton, "ain't independent [like ranchers]. They got to have them co-ops, just to be sure no one's taking advantage of them. They got to have everything written

down before they do for each other."[115] Kramer's Blanton's equating writing with dependence echoes Plato's association of writing with the Hellenes who were damned by their failure to recall the dialectical means of attaining knowledge. All Solon can do when asked by the Egyptian priest to historicize Hellene antiquity is recite a genealogy of names. Yet, Plato also uses writing, the only means by which he can manipulate time and sequence, to authorize his creation of the world. Similarly, Kramer uses writing to authorize the critical juncture which most clearly empowers her proposition concerning culture and myth. For it is Blanton's failure at writing which brings the conflict between the myth which dominates Blanton's culture and thus his life and the cycle of change which opposes it to a climax.

Kramer notes that an important symbol of the cowboy myth is the handshake: "A cowboy [shakes] hands where ordinary men [sign] contracts [just as] a cowboy [draws] his gun where ordinary men [go] home."[116] Blanton expands the symbol into dictum, stating,

> 'Seems to me a man's handshake ought to be enough. My Granddaddy Abel never signed no contract. My granddaddy always said a man's word should be his contract, and that's what I do believe, and that's what any cowboy believes, . . . and that's how I'm going to

live.'[117]

Blanton's handshake thus forms the contractual arrangement binding the agreement between Blanton and Lester Hill, the ranch manager, to become equal owners of a "batch of Okie calves that Lester had bought, with a bank loan, through an agent in Louisiana."[118] Under the terms of the agreement, Blanton was to care for the calves for a season while they foraged with the ranch cattle. At the end of the season, Blanton and Lester would split equally the profits gained from the calves' sale. Despite George Smith's warning that Blanton should get "something down on paper about that deal of yours" and Betsy's fearful observation that "Lester is always taking advantage of [Henry],"[119] Blanton persists in his dream of acquiring wealth through the cowboy myth just as George Smith had. After adding up the profit on "a hundred calves, bought cheap, grazed well, and sold at the Amarillo Livestock Auction with a lot of water bringing up their weight,"[120] Blanton's future is decided; he will invest those profits in another hundred head, sell them, and then purchase two hundred head. Thus, "in a few years, he would have the cash for a down payment on a few sections of his own."[121]

Blanton's dream comes to an abrupt end on "a day in June when summer seemed to settle over the Panhandle like a cloak of heat."[122] Henry receives Lester's catastrophic call over the two-way radio Lester installed in the truck

and Blanton keeps turned off when he "tour[s] the ranch alone or [performs] the chores at headquarters."[123] To Blanton, the radio represents a challenge to his authority as foreman of the Willow ranch and to his perception of himself as the heroic, solitary cowboy; for Kramer's proposition, the radio functions as the device that actualizes the ruinous feelings of inadequacy and fear that, like the feelings of affirmation and hope, result from a myth's domination of a culture. Lester wants "his" calves rounded up, for the summer heat and the lack of rain promise drought, and he has an offer for the calves that amounts to "just enough to cover his costs. . . . And Henry would understand that [Lester] couldn't risk losing money on a droughty summer, not with a bank loan due. . . ."[124] Lester concludes his apocryphal communication with Henry with a weak appeal to their friendship: "'I sure appreciate your taking care of this. . . . I mean, I wouldn't want you going to no trouble with them calves. Not on my account. But, hell, friends is friends--right?'"[125] Henry's response is to drive to town, get drunk, and drive home again, arriving in the courtyard "too drunk to move."[126] This inability to act represents the static nature of his life under the domination of the cowboy myth, a nature Henry admits when he tells Betsy, after she manages to get him out of the truck, "'I guess this is the other part of cowboying,

ain't it? The part when all the craziness comes out.'"[127] Moreover, Sam Otis's response to Henry's collapsed world highlights his secondary role as Henry's emotional spokesman, for Sam can say what Henry's powerless character cannot: "'My gun, where's my gun. . . . Now, why didn't I use that gun this morning? What do I got to live for?'"[128]

The affirmation and hope in the cowboy myth, although greatly weakened, provide Henry with a limited means of avoiding physical suicide. Ironically, however, the feelings bring him not back into the grace of the myth but into a vengeful, "noncowboy" act representative of the cycle of change opposed to the myth. While sitting at the kitchen table with Betsy and Sam, listening to Betsy's attempts to convince Sam that he still has a life worth living, Henry contradicts Sam's definition of cowpunching by relying once more on the cowboy's code of assisting the weak. Cowpunching is not roping or riding a horse or even being smart; rather cowpunching is "thinking enough about a dumb animal to go out in the rain or snow and try to save that cow. Not for the guy that owns the cow but for that poor cow and her calf. It's getting down in that bog--in quicksand, if you got the guts."[129] Henry's definition, an explanation based on the cowboy code, which insists on helping the weak and which illuminates the special relation with nature that characterizes

the mythical cowboy, leads him to commit an act of revenge that takes him from the protective affirmation of the myth and into the deadly cycle of change. After spending the night in his pickup because he does not "have the heart to face Betsy with the news that his deal with Lester [is] over,"[130] Henry sees some of the large Brangus studs from the neighboring ranch trying to mate with his smaller and "weaker" heifers. Saddling Pepper, he rides the pasture, finding a heifer "sprawled flat and frothing--and so worked over she could not get up."[131] Roping one of the bulls, Henry works him "hard" until the exhausted bull is lying on the ground. Taking out his knife, Henry proclaims, "'The way I see it, it's like you had a daughter and she was raped.'"[132] He then castrates the bull, and in so doing commits economic suicide. In the cowboy culture, such a "noncowboy" act is akin to rustling. Blanton realizes this, and the momentary satisfaction he gains fades with the roping of the second bull. Blanton "[knows] he [is] not expressing right--not expressing right at all--but . . . there [is] nothing he [can] do about it."[133]

Kramer's final actualization of the full power of her proposition that a myth's domination of a culture results in its members feeling the contradictory emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope invokes the textual authority of the method underlying Plato's

"Timaeus." In the dialogue, Plato's Timaeus notes that "we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods--that is what they say--and they must surely have known their own ancestors."[134] Further, Plato's Timaeus invokes the voice of the creator, attributing to that artisan the statement, "Gods, children of gods, who are my works and of whom I am the artificer and father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be undone, but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious. . . ."[135] In this fashion, Plato grounds Timaeus's explanation of the creation of the world in the authority of a creator who is both unattainable to those who wish to counter Plato's Timaeus's creation tale and is beyond comprehension by men. The creator is "past finding out."[136] In addition, Plato locates Timaeus's tale in the descriptions of long-dead ancestors who, like the creator, are both unattainable and, as philosophers capable of understanding the soul and its knowledge, "past finding out" by the damned believers of this world. Kramer, the previously demonstrated ethnographic heir to Plato's authority who takes Plato's place as the manipulator of the prodding finger, textually supports her authority in a similar fashion. Kramer's Blanton's invocation of the "caring for the weak" code of the cowboy myth is grounded in Blanton's long-dead grandfather who, as one of the

mythical nineteenth-century cowboys, "took a job [as a cowpuncher for the XIT ranch] while he saved money for a down payment on his own spread."[137] By 1886 he had enough money saved to make a down payment on six sections, but low cattle prices, droughts, freezes, infectious diseases, and high interest rates pared the ranch to a mere section by 1918. Nonetheless, while nearly dying from influenza during the January storms of 1919, Abel Blanton still rode out, "his chest rubbed down with . . . special liniment of camphor, bacon grease, and coal oil" to care for the cattle that could still "walk . . . after a month of hunger and punishing snowstorms."[138] After selling the remaining cows for "what he could get" and the last section of land for "not much more than he had paid,"[139] Abel Blanton went to work once more as a cowpuncher for a rancher who had offered him a job years earlier. He died while working for that rancher. Moreover, Kramer as textual artisan creates a world whose orderly domination by the cowboy myth reflects Plato's creator's description of a "harmonious" creation that can only be "undone" by evil. Kramer's Henry Blanton's evil castration of the Brangas bull thus destroys Kramer's orderly world of the cowboy culture, thus promotes the dominative character of Kramer's textualized authority and method as inherited from Plato, and thus endows subsequent ethnographies in this genre with a model embued with authoritative power.

An examination of McPhee's Basin and Range and Kunze's Highroad to the Stake will reveal the dominative features of Kramer's model.

Section III

"[Fictive ethnographies] offer the fresh perspectives of some very talented and insightful . . . ethnographers who are blissfully unconcerned with and free of the historically routinized formats of cultural story telling."[140]

By superimposing John McPhee's visage onto Socrates's countenance and Jane Kramer's onto Plato's in Derrida's portrait on the postcard, a transference made easier by John Van Maanen's bringing Kramer's and McPhee's texts together in his discussion of this ethnographic genre's tendency to show "reality . . . theatrically without great concern for interpreting the recreated world for the audience" and to use "the writer's . . . self as the register and filter of worldly happenings,"[141] Harold Bloom's process of influence which links McPhee's Basin and Range with Kramer's text, as well as with those texts developed by Interpretive/Translative and Realist ethnographers and Plato, becomes apparent. For like Kramer, McPhee occupies a link in the chain of inheritance stretching from Plato through the Realists and Interpretivists/Translativists and thus is an heir to Plato's

method of attaining truth via a dialectical treatment of concepts, definitions, and inference. McPhee, therefore, acquires the authoritative power of Kramer, the Interpretivists/Translativists, the Realists, and Plato through his evocation of a rhetoric of entitlement which acquires meaning through the discourse's dialectical symbolic significance. As a result, McPhee occupies the objective stance of his predecessors; within the universe of his discourse he is the single guide to truth. In the "Timaeus," this position is filled by Plato and is described as capable of being employed only by the person "who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom, and has exercised . . . intellect more than any other part . . . [and has] thoughts immortal and divine . . . [and is thus] immortal, and . . . ever cherishing the divine power. . . ."[142] In other words, McPhee's stance is embued with the "divine power" that accompanies his "earnest" pursuit of knowledge and its subsequent truth. Within this universe of discourse, McPhee is thus dominative, and as the creator of the rules guiding the text, he is the authority.

McPhee, like Kramer and Plato, relies on a dialectical method of using syllogistic investigations of oppositions to develop premises needed to support a proposition. The beginning pages of his text thus resound with a rhetoric of opposition. The concept of the earth's poles as fixed

positions is opposed to that which describes the poles as constantly moving. Moreover, the motif of movement gives rise to further oppositions: the quiet surrounding the west apron of the George Washington Bridge on a Sunday morning as opposed to the "gross demonstration in particle physics"[143] which occurs on weekday mornings; the rock walls of roadcuts, symbolic of natural processes of geologic formation as opposed to the asphalt and concrete highways which lead the "particles" from their source to "Chicago, Cheyenne, [and] Sacramento;"[144] the "Latin" eyes, as opposed to the "Nordic" facial features, of Karen Kleinspehn, a geologist examining the rock layers laid bare by a New Jersey roadcut for geologic support for her dissertation's claim that she "and the road and the rock before her, and the big bridge and its awsome city--in fact, nearly the whole of the continental United States and Canada and Mexico . . . are in a stately manner moving;"[145] human decorations in the form of "a huge rubber sandal . . . a crate of broken eggs, three golf balls . . . [and a windblown] soda can" as opposed to nature's decorations in the form of "pin oaks, sycamores, aspens, cottonwoods, [that] have come in on the wind with milkweed, wisteria, . . . [and the] fossil burrows in the slate . . . where Triassic animals travelled through the quiet mud. . . ."[146] These oppositions, all bespeaking movement, also form an image of time, a second motif

which, when combined with the motif of movement, produces a context within which a roadcut functions for geologists as a "portal, a fragment of a regional story, a proscenium arch that leads [geologists'] imaginations into the earth and through the surrounding terrain."[147] Further, time, divided into Cretaceous, Jurassic, Triassic, Tertiary, and Quaternary periods, and featured in an artistic rendering as the guiding principle in McPhee's text, becomes the Platonic image of Truth through which the geologist informants in McPhee's study form their dialectical arguments concerning the earth.

It is McPhee's Platonic use of time as an image of Truth, along with his dialectical use of oppositions, which confirms his position in the Platonic line of inheritance as portrayed on Derrida's postcard. In addition, McPhee's use of time as an image of Truth and his use of dialectically-posed oppositions as the source of a syllogistic investigation powers his ethnography of geologists and provides the premises supporting his proposition concerning the way myth affects a culture of scientists. If myths are defined as "rhetorical reinforcements of ideas . . . [myths are] 'ideological' in the sense that, where they gain . . . currency in formal expression, they can be shown to represent the particular perspective of some more or less limited group, to sanction special interests in terms of universal validity,"[148]

then their collisions will manifest themselves in ideological oppositions whose rhetorics make evident the friction between them and develop a persuasive authority based on the rhetorics' abilities to demonstrate "universal validity." That this is, in fact, McPhee's proposition is revealed in his movement and time-tinged statement of purpose:

> When I was seventeen . . . I was taught the rudiments of what is now referred to as the Old Geology. The New Geology is the package phrase for the effects of the revolution that occurred in earth science in the nineteen sixties, when geologists . . . began to discuss . . . the interactions of some twenty parts of the globe . . . [in terms of] plate tectonics. [N]ow . . . middle-aged and fading, I wanted to learn some geology again, to feel the difference between the Old and the New. . . .[149]

The names "Old" and "New" reveal the friction between the metaphors used to represent the opposed ideologies, a process very like the metaphorical nature of geology. According to Kenneth Deffeyes, McPhee's primary informant, geologists "look at mud and see mountains, in mountains oceans, in oceans mountains to be. They go up to some rock and figure out a story, another rock, another story, and as the stories compile through time they connect."[150]

Thus, "Old" geology becomes the study of "isostatic adjustments and degraded channels, of angular unconformities . . . and a formation . . . derived . . . from the solution and collapse of another formation."[151] It is, in other words, a study of isolated, motionless features. "New" geology, however, is the study of the "consequences . . . [that derive from] pulling a continent apart . . . [the study of] surface vacanc[ies], which [are] faulting[s], and subsurface vacanc[ies], which [cause] upwelling[s] of hot mantle that intrudes as sills or comes out as lava flows."[152] It is, in other words, a study of clumped together geological features whose characteristics are metaphors for the fault blocks whose movements tear continents apart and bring together land masses that were previously unrelated. And the two means of pursuing "geology" contain senses of "universal validity" equally in conflict, notions whose confrontations suggest the current ideological struggle between literary structuralists who view a text in isolation and whose conclusions are validated by the identification of patterns of identical structures in other texts and literary "postmodernists" who, for example, view a text as part of an evolving canon and whose conclusions are validated by, for example, economic, psychological, or gender-based symbol systems. Thus, McPhee, like Kramer and Plato, uses a process of historicization to frame a "tale" so that he

"tale" so that he might use that frame as a means of depicting oppositions whose rhetoric develops the premises needed to support a proposition. In McPhee's text, the proposition is that the collision of myths in a culture of scientists will result in what Clifford Geertz calls a "strain,"[153] that the culture's members attempt to ease by developing "standards and procedures for changing the [myths] from inside--motivating critics and helping distinguish good modifications from bad."[154] In other words, a scientific culture's domination by conflicting myths will reveal itself in a rhetoric similar to that of Kramer's Henry Blanton; like Blanton, the geologist members of McPhee's culture will produce a rhetoric whose characteristics may be described as resulting from the conflicting emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope. The emotions can be seen in the metaphors used to portray one or the other myths and in the actions taken by the cultural members.

McPhee uses the Platonic combination of figurative language and dialectic to invoke Plato's notion of time as an image of Truth and to juxtapose it with both the motif of motion and his proposition concerning myths in conflict and the result of that conflict on the culture of scientists dominated by those myths. The resulting rhetoric of opposition creates a world whose inhabitants who move from geologic site to geologic site, much as traffic on an

interstate highway does, searching for information deemed acceptable by the "standards" and in ways held acceptable by the "procedures" developed by the geologists to change their myths. Thus, McPhee begins his study with a description of his field experience grounded in both time and motion: "I would go back and forth across [the country] like some sort of shuttle working out on a loom, accompanying geologists on purposes of their own or being accompanied by them from cut to cut and coast to coast."[155] These journeys form the basis for his rhetorical oppositions, beginning with the oppositions between basins, faults, and ranges, the prominent aspects of the plate tectonic myth, the source of McPhee's text's title, and the features indicative of McPhee's use of Plato's method of dividing and collecting. The Pleasant Valley basin and the Tobin range of Nevada form the context for the first of these oppositions which takes the form of an opposition between what is "synopsized and dismissed as 'desert'"[156] and what is described as habitable and useful land. McPhee extends this opposition by using the animal life characteristic of both as symbols of this opposition. The "coyote and the pocket mouses, the side-blotched lizard and the vagrant shrew" represent the desert, while the "minks and river otters . . . deer and antelope . . . pelicans [and] cormorants"[157] represent the less formidable areas. The importance of this distinction, however,

lies in its falsehood. The animal species listed above are part of an entire ecosystem and cannot be examined as isolated entities. Thus, by collecting the fauna living in the basin and range, McPhee uses them as a metaphor for the division between Old and New geology. This distinction reaches its climax in McPhee's description of the basin and range as parts of a singular consequence of tectonic shifts. The range is "like a warship . . . [and the basin] is an ocean of loose sediment with [the mountain range] standing in it as if they were members of a fleet without precedent."[158] When combined with the simultaneous processes of ranges rising because of tectonic pressure and ranges falling because of erosion, the resulting geological metaphor for the opposition between Old and New geology echoes Plato's Timaeus's gold figurine metaphor for the opposition between Being and Becoming. Plato's Timaeus says,

> Suppose a person to make all kinds of figures of gold and to be always remodeling each form into all the rest; somebody points to one of them and asks what it is. By far the safest and truest answer is, 'That is gold,' and not to call the triangle or any other figures which are formed in the gold 'these,' as though they had existence, since they are in process of change while he is making the assertion, but if the questioner be

> willing to take the safe and indefinite expression, 'such,' we should be satisfied. And the same argument applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies. . . .[159]

Just as Plato's Timaeus sees the figurines as composed of a golden essence (Being) best described in terms of a metaphorical "such" (Becoming), McPhee sees the effects of opposed myths on his culture of geologists (Being) best described in terms of a metaphorical relationship between ridge and basin formation and New Geology (Becoming).

More important to this study is what McPhee's initial set of oppositions and metaphors reveals about his reliance on Platonic method and that reliance's subsequent affect on McPhee's sense of textual authority. First, McPhee's use of the myths of Old and New geology to historicize his creation of a world of geologists mirrors Plato's use of Critias's tale to historicize his depiction of the creation of the world. Both writers gain a sense of truth by grounding their creations in recognized voices of authority. For Plato, these are the voices of Solon and Critias; for McPhee, these are the voices of his informants: "Karen Kleinspehn . . . David Love, of the United States Geological Survey . . . Eldreidge Moores, of the University of California at Davis . . . [and] Kenneth Deffeyes of Princeton University."[160] Second, as recording secretary for his informants, McPhee, like Plato with

Solon, Critias, and Socrates, hegemonizes their voices, changing the dialogue between the geologists and McPhee to a monologue which presents McPhee's as the voice (pen) of authority. Thus, McPhee, like Plato, uses writing to textualize his dominative authority. Third, as the only "philosopher" in a textual world inhabited by myth dominated geologist believers, McPhee is the sole guide capable of dialectically leading the reader to the truth inherent in his portrayal of the effects myth domination has on this world. The two hypotheses concerning Fictive ethnography stated after the analysis of the "Timaeus" therefore appear to continue to be accurate. Plato's face does change to McPhee's, while Socrates's persona takes on the characteristics of the field geologist. In light of this initial confirmation of the first hypothesis, the first portion of McPhee's text appears to validate the second hypothesis as well. The monologic ethnography which is the product of the dialogues which occurred during McPhee's "shuttle-like" journeys across the country reproduces the soul of the Platonic model. An examination of the remainder of McPhee's text will indicate the continued strength of the hypotheses.

McPhee continues developing the metaphor begun with his listing of the animal species living in the Pleasant Valley basin and on the Tobin range by using them to show that the basin and range do not form a desert of isolated

geological features. Instead, the basin and range are "alive" with surface and subsurface life. Below the animals and the sage,

> [t]he earth is moving. The faults are moving. There are hot springs all over the province. There are young volcanic rocks. Fault scars everywhere. The world is splitting open and coming apart. You see a sudden break in the sage . . . and it says to you that a fault is there and a fault block is coming up. This Nevada topography is what you see <u>during</u> mountain building. This is the tectonic, active, spreading, mountain-building world.[161]

The further development of the metaphor, however, has the same result as the original; by portraying the living "tectonic" world as a metaphor for the New geology myth and the "desert" world as a metaphor for the Old geology myth, McPhee places the two myths in a collision of process and product. Moreover, since the living world of New geology resounds with the Plato's Timaeus's vision of the world as "a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God"[162] and the desert world of Old Geology is permeated by Plato's Timaeus's description of "sensible things . . . apprehended by opinion and sense,"[163] New geology becomes, in Platonic terms, the realm of the philosopher while Old geology

becomes the realm of the sophists. It is thus New geology's duty to provide the standards and procedures for easing the "strain" resulting from the myths' collision. Finally, as the chronicler of the metaphors depicting this culture, McPhee's position of authority, like Plato's is assured through his fully premised syllogistic investigation of the rhetorical oppositions created by the metaphors.

The second major metaphor McPhee creates in his rhetoric of oppositions is one of water, a metaphor which is coherently linked with the earlier image of a battleship-like mountain range afloat in an ocean-like basin and which shows the "basin-range fault blocks . . . floating on the mantle."[164] Although the mantle is solid, its "white hot . . . but magisterially viscous [nature] permit[s] the crust above it to 'float.'"[165] Through the concept of "isostatic adjustment," then, a fault block acts much like a block of wood held under water. When released, the wooden block "adjusts itself to the surface isostatically. A frog sits on the wood. It goes down. He vomits. It goes up a little. He jumps. It adjusts."[166] Thus, when, for example, periods of glaciation add the weight of miles of ice upon a portion of the surface of the earth, the fault blocks under the earth's crust at that point are compressed downward like the block of wood. The resultant pressure causes adjacent fault

blocks that are not affected by the ice to push upwards, creating mountain ranges whose rock layers show the layers of silt, sand and mud that, because of the pressure and heat caused by the block's previous position, have turned to siltstone, sandstone, and shale. When the glacial ice melts, the area under its influence rises, but subsequent erosion from the newly-raised range contributes additional material which again compresses the area vacated by the glacial ice. Thus, the basin surrounding the mountain "warship" develops from the same process that forms the range. Further, just as the submerged block of wood brings up water when it surfaces, "when a mountain range comes up into the air, a whole lot comes up with it."[167] This extra material includes "magma . . . [and where there is a fracture] water . . . rich in dissolved minerals . . . [such as] silver, tungsten, copper, [and] gold."[168]

Solidified in pockets, cracks, and seams in the surrounding rocks, the minerals drew to Nevada the miners whose futures were tied to exploiting the Pleasant Valley basin and Tobin range and assist in drawing geologist Deffeyes and accompanying ethnographer McPhee to this specific basin and range. As McPhee notes, "[Deffeyes comes to Nevada] seeking insight into the way in which the rifting earth comes apart. His ideas about silver, on the other hand, may send his children to college."[169]

More importantly, McPhee's water metaphor draws the spirit of Plato's model into McPhee's copy through its invocation of Plato's Timaeus's dialectical creation of the world. For just as Plato's Timaeus uses the elements of earth, air, fire, and water as "general affections of the whole body"[170] may be perceived, McPhee uses geological features as visible images through which the "general affections" of the tectonic myth may be perceived. Further, just as Plato's Timaeus uses "the whole body" as a visible image of God making the world "the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair and good"[171] and thus of the soul, McPhee uses his embodiment of tectonic myth as a visible image of a dominant myth in action. Deffeyes's standards and procedures used to collect and divide information are formed according to the myth's precepts; he is thus drawn to Nevada by the promise its geology holds for either supporting or changing the tectonic myth through maintaining or reworking the metaphorical relation between "the subtle differences in the histories of one fault block and another"[172] and the New geology's portrait of the earth. As a result, the rhetorical oppositions between New and Old geology, between the earth's mantle and the fault blocks, between the fault blocks themselves, and between range and basin generated by the water metaphor support the premise established by McPhee's original metaphor of life and motion.

As McPhee did with his initial metaphor, he extends the water metaphor. This extension of the second metaphor further follows the first one in that it, too, creates an opposition McPhee uses to support his premise. In the case of the second metaphor, however, the opposition is a climactic one; the "change in world climate that made ice in the north temporarily preempted [the preceding climactic conditions] and dropped into the Great Basin torrents from the sky."[173] The water metaphor thus broadens, taking in not only the earth's fault blocks and mantle, but also the mountains and basins themselves, thereby strengthening the "battleship" image of the mountains. According to McPhee, the resulting "big lakes in time connected the basins"[174] and formed the inland "seas" exemplified by Lake Manlius, now Death Valley. Another of these large bodies of water, Lake Bonneville, spread to the size of Lake Michigan and then "sat there for thousands of years with limestone terraces forming and waves cutting benches at the shoreline."[175] Subsequent periods of dryness forced Bonneville to shrink, forming eventually Great Salt Lake. The importance, however, to McPhee lies in the water's hegemonic capacity. Like Plato's Timaeus's account in which

> the world has received animals, mortal and immortal, and is fulfilled with them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible--the

> sensible God who is the image of the intellectual, the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect,[176]

McPhee's account, through the water metaphor's ability to dominate and control the geology of the earth, becomes a "visible animal" of the tectonic myth's domination of the geologists' culture.

The Great Salt Lake provides the geographic feature McPhee uses to link coherently his third metaphorical opposition, the seasonal opposition between winter and summer, with his second metaphor. Noting that he has seen "the salt lake incredibly beautiful in winter dusk under snow-streamer curtains of cloud moving fast through the sky, with the wall of the Wasatch a deep rose and the lake islands rising from what seemed to be rippled slate,"[177] McPhee rhetorically opposes the stark beauty of the isolated features emphasized by the Old geology myth with his summertime immersion in the salt lake's waters. McPhee collects eggstones, made from layers of calcium carbonate compressed around a silica core, from the bottom of the lake while the salt water "trying to pull fresh water through [his] skin . . . closed [his] pores tight and [caused his] lips to swell and become slightly numb."[178] The eggstones symbolically link Great Salt Lake with the tectonic myth, for New geologists "inferentially" associate them with a "shallow, lime-rich Cambrian sea"[179] created during the climatic change following the tectonic

formation of the basin and range. Further, the tectonic myth's explanatory power over the birth, life, and death, of ranges and basins is demonstrated in the summertime life cycle attached to the Great Salt Lake:

> On the firm flat beach of the Great Salt Lake were many hundreds of thousands of brine flies--broad dark patches of them hopping and buzzing a steady collective electrical hum. A sacred gull made short bursts through the brine flies, its bill clapping. Three years before gulls ate crickets and saved the Mormons, Kit Carson shot gulls to feed the starving emigrants. Now, at the end of spring runoff, dead creatures were everywhere.[180]

McPhee extends this seasonal metaphor to the ancient shores of California's Lake Bonneville, where, in the company of New geologist Kenneth Deffeyes, the winter winds blow the snow from the rocks of a roadcut and reveal

> a sheer and massive section of handsome blue rock, thinly bedded, evenly bedded, forty metres high. Its parallel planes [tilted] . . . to the east, with the exception of some confused and crumpled material that suggested . . . a broken down doorway in an otherwise undamaged wall.[181]

The fact that this rock is "not a manifestation of some major tectonic event [but is] an item for an inside

page"[182] indicates both the metaphorical relationship between the winter and Old geology. McPhee uses similarly the tropical climate of Bonaire to represent the metaphorical relation between the summer and New geology and to once again tie his informant, Kenneth Deffeyes, to the New geology myth. McPhee notes that following graduate school, Deffeyes went to Bonaire and found "a lagoon that was concentrating under the sun . . . 'making a juice very rich in magnesium' [that was] flowing through the limestone below and changing it into dolomite."[183] This was the same blue rock revealed by the winter wind near Lake Bonneville. The important aspect here is in the different treatment of the dolomite by the followers of the opposed myths. Where Old geology treats dolomite as simply a form of limestone, New geology treats dolomite as representitive of the "Picture": "The [eggstones] and dolomite--tuff and granite, the . . . siltstones and shales--are pieces of the Picture. The stories that go with them . . . may well, as stories, stand on their own, but all are fragments of the Picture."[184] Thus, the magnesium "juice" needed to change limestone to dolomite and carried by water circulated through a fissure in the fault bordering a block, represents the process illuminating the "Picture."

In this manner, alternating between the winter and summer perspectives whose oppositions reveal rhetorically

the myths of Old and New geology, McPhee and Deffeyes move "along from roadcut to roadcut, range to range, like barnyard poultry pecking up rock, seeing what the fault blocks had lifted from below."[185] Moreover, the summer-time views of the grain-like remains of the material lifted by the fault blocks are grounded in juxtaposed images of time, showing the diacronic nature of New geology's tectonic process as opposed to the synchronic nature of Old geology's products. According to McPhee, the blue dolomite of both Bonaire and Lake Bonneville

> approached five hundred million years. Captain Howard Stansbury, USA, whose name would rest upon the mountains of which the [dolomite] was a component, was approaching fifty when he came into the Great Basin in 1849. With sixteen mules, a water keg, and some India-rubber bags, he circumambulated the lake. . . . People told him not to try it. He ran out of water but not of luck. And he came back with a story of having seen . . . scattered books, clothing, trunks, [and] tools.[186]

These were weighty objects left by the luckless Donner Party who passed this way in 1846. More importantly, the images of the Donner Party's cast-off materials invokes the cast-off material from the rising fault blocks sought by Deffeyes and McPhee, and the life and death struggle of

the California-bound settlers invokes the diachronic story of the life and death of ranges and basins told by New geology's tectonic myth.

The winter metaphor attached to Old geology further provides McPhee with a means of historicizing his key informant, Kenneth Deffeyes. By relating Deffeyes's education and subsequent career to a skier's run down a slope, Deffeyes's education in Old geology, his move to the New geology's myth, and the acknowledgement by his fellow pursuers of New geology's "Picture" of his authority become concrete:

> . . . outclassed [by the other skiers] on his own team, [the skier's] day came when a great whiteout sent the superstars sprawling on the mountain. [The skier's] turn for the slalom came late in the afternoon, and just as he was moving toward the gate the whiteout turned to alpenglow, suddenly bringing into focus the well-compacted snow. He shoved off, and was soon bombing. He went down the mountain like an object dropped from a tower. In the end, his time placed him high among the ranking stars.[187]

Juxtaposed with the coldness of the Old geology's ski slope is the heat surrounding New geology's fault blocks. McPhee's Deffeyes notes the importance of this heat to the tectonic myth: above the fault block, the earth's crust is

"brittle"; around and below the block lies the "plastic" ocean of the heated mantle. "'If the temperature gradient were different and the cold brittle zone went down . . . the blocks would not have mechanical freedom.'"[188] In other words, without the heat, the fault blocks could not move, and the tectonic myth would be powerless, locked in the frozen grip of Old geology's myth.

McPhee's fourth major metaphor, a metaphor which reveals the opposition between tunnel and panoramic vision and thus the perspectives derived from the myths of Old and New geology, brings the reader through the tunnel at Carlin Canyon, Nevada, into the daylight illuminating New geology. Moreover, the tunnel metaphor invokes the power of the previous metaphors of life and water, for the geological focal point in the canyon, "two . . . rock formations, awry to each other, awry to the gyroscope of the earth--just stuck together there like two artistic impulses,"[189] is diminished by the surrounding junipers and the "Humboldt River . . . flowing toward us . . . sage and green meadow beside it, and dry russet uplands rising behind."[190] Nonetheless, the key to understanding the formation of this ecosystem is New geology's perspective of the rock formations whose upper, stratified layers of "sedimentary rock, put down originally in and beside the sea, where they had lain, initially, flat . . . were dipping more than sixty degrees, and the strata of the

lower part . . . were standing almost straight up on end."[191] Whereas the tunnel vision of Old geology would focus on the rock formations as isolated entities, New geology's vision allows for the development of the entire area. As McPhee's Deffeyes says,

> 'to account for [those formations] you had to build a mountain range, destroy it, and then build a second set of mountains in the same place, and then for the most part destroy them. [The tectonic] forces that had compressed the region and produced mountains would have tilted the . . . conglomerate, not to the vertical, where it stood now, but to something like forty-five degrees. That mountain range wore away . . . [and was] eventually covered by a sea. In the water, the new sediment of the upper formation would have accumulated gradually . . . and later the [tectonic] forces building a fresh mountain range would have shoved, lifted, and rotated the whole package . . . to its present position.'[192]

It is this explanation of the Carlin Canyon ecosystem, grounded in the Platonic treatment of time as an image of Truth, which represents the myth of New geology's conflict with the myth of Old geology, a conflict, McPhee states, identical with the conflict between the myths of Old

geology and theology in the eighteenth century. For it was a rock formation in Scotland identical in structure to the ones in Carlin Canyon "that helped to bring the history of the earth . . . out of theological metaphor and into the perspectives of actual time."[193] "Conventional," or theological, wisdom, written by Abraham Werner of the Freiberg Mining Academy, envisioned an earth "five thousand [to] six thousand years old" whose rocks "of every kind . . . had precipitated out of solution in a globe-engulfing sea."[194] Moreover, according to McPhee, some "contemporary [New] geologists discern in Werner the lineal antecedence of what has come to be known as black-box [Old] geology."[195]

Within this context, all competing geological explanations that "failed to resemble [Werner's] picture [were] described . . . as heresies [and] 'visionary fabrics.'"[196] Included within this heretical group was James Hutton's book which described the Lammermuir Hills, the Scottish version of the Carlin Canyon formations as cliffs in which "the strata of the lower formation had been upturned to become vertical columns, on which rested the Old Red Sandstone, like the top of a weather-beaten table."[197] Hutton is therefore seen by New geologists as their myth's founding father, an ancestor whose position amidst "the direct antagonism between science and theology [created when] geologists began to impugn the Mosaic

account of the creation,"[198] foreshadows their own position between the conflicting myths of Old and New geology.

Having thus depicted the feelings of inadequacy and fear the New geologist members of this scientific culture reveal in their rituals defined by their dominating myth and in their descriptions of Old geology's myth defined by the collision of the two myths, McPhee portrays the contradictory feelings of affirmation and hope created by the New geologists' dominant myth in Deffeyes's search for silver in the Sonoma Range of Nevada. Buoyed by the tectonic myth's depiction of hydrothermal activity as occurring in the faults between blocks where water and magma come into contact, Deffeyes searches for the places where the heated water carried precious metals into the cracks and fissures of the rock brought to the surface by rising fault blocks. In the Sonoma Range, "the crustal blocks . . . pulled apart . . . and springs boiled up along the faults [thus depositing] silver throughout the Basin and Range."[199] Erosion, however, broke up the deposits, causing them to concentrate in specific locations, and rainfall changed the "silver sulphides to silver chloride, heavy stuff that stayed right where it was and--through thousands of millennia--increased in concentration as more rain fell."[200] It was on these concentrated locations that nineteenth-century mining towns "with names like Hardscrabble, Gouge Eye, Battle

Mountain, [and] Treasure Hill"[201] were built and where fortunes were made and lost. Thus, Deffeyes's search, an act based on the senses of affirmation and hope created by domination of the New geology myth, focuses on "the secondary recovery of silver"[202] from small mines "that produced more than a certain number of dollars' worth of silver between 1860 and 1900"[203] and that were overlooked by twentieth-century prospectors. As a result, McPhee, accompanied by Deffeyes, finds himself "crawling like a Japanese beetle across the face of [an unidentified] mountain"[204] in the Sonoma Range. In the tailings of an old mine located at the head of a canyon through which flowed a "little stream [surrounded by] a jumble of boulders, testimony of the floods, with phreatophytes around the boulders like implanted spears,"[205] Deffeyes digs "a little plastic-lined pond of weak cyanide"[206] with which he treats rock suspected of containing silver. Eventually, he would discover "a blue streak in the tailings [that] would come in at fifty-eight ounces a ton"[207] and would result in his having "a five-pound ingot of raw silver on the floor, propping open the door [of his portable laboratory]."[208] At the same time, Deffeyes's friend, Jason Morgan, the geologist whose paper "defined the boundaries and motions of the [tectonic] plates [decided] the most exciting thing to do next would be to prove the theory [the myth on which New geology is based]

wrong."[209] According to McPhee, such an achievement "would be a reversal comparable to the debunking of Genesis"[210] and the "debunking" of Old Geology. Thus, the process of affirmation is completed; Deffeyes finds the rewards promised by his myth, McPhee finds the final actualization of his proposition, and the reader finds yet another heir to Plato's sense of textual authority.

Michael Kunze continues the dominative nature of rhetorical opposition as a means of constructing textual authority begun by Plato and maintained by Kramer and McPhee in his Highroad to the Stake. For just as Plato uses Critias's tale, as Kramer uses the myth of the American Old West, and as McPhee uses the myths of Old and New geology, Kunze uses the tale of an early seventeenth-century Bavarian family accused of witchcraft to historicize his ethnography of that time period's Bavarian culture. Further, like Plato's Critias and Kramer's and McPhee's personae who listen to their informants' words until they are "branded" into memory or recorded into "stacks" of notebooks, Kunze reads his informants' words in the official documents of the witchcraft trial and textually "amplifies" their voices so that his "'heroes' speak for themselves; they tell us what they felt and thought, what they put their faith in, and what inspired their doubts; they tell us of their remedies for poverty and sickness; they tell us how they played and laughed,

suffered and dreamed."[211]

The most important similarity between the four texts, however, is Kunze's reliance on the dialectical method of using a syllogistic examination of rhetorical oppositions to develop the premises needed to support a proposition. While Kunze's proposition, like Kramer's and McPhee's, differs from Plato's, the goals are the same: all four writers historicize tales in order to support their depictions of cultures. Kunze's descriptions of the Bavarians' lives is grounded historically in an age over which "dark clouds hung . . . unseen, but manifest[ed in] the great war presaged by all the omens [as] the most terrible of all, the ultimate conflict to be endured by mankind."[212] As a result, Kunze's seventeenth-century Bavarians, like Kramer's Henry Blanton and McPhee's Kenneth Deffeyes, are placed in the position of Plato's believers. Thus, the Bavarians become representative of the opposition between the philosopher's (ethnographer's) perception of the soul (myth) and the believers' (informants') perception of sensibles, as well as Kenneth Burke's notion of the ideological aura surrounding the transcendental rhetoric needed to move hierarchically from one to the other. The Bavarian's voices as recorded in Kunze's source documents, therefore, cannot dispute Kunze's observations, for their words are dominated by Kunze's words. In this fashion, Kunze, like McPhee, Kramer, and Plato, uses writing to

textualize his authority. Moreover, as the only "philosopher" in a textual world inhabited by believers, Kunze is the only guide capable of dialectically leading the reader to the truth of his mythic portrait of seventeenth-century Bavarians.

It seems, then, that the two hypotheses concerning the relationship between Plato and Fictive ethnographers are initially supported. The Preface of Kunze's text reveals the same ideologic and hegemonic characteristics identified in Plato's "Timaeus." Derrida's portrait of Plato's relationship with Socrates thus changes, allowing Socrates's features to take on those of Kunze. Further evolution of Derrida's protrait, following the above analysis of Kunze's text, shows Plato's face changing to Kunze's, while Socrates's visage becomes the face of an early seventeenth-century Bavarian. In light of this apparent confirmation of the first hypothesis, the Preface to Kunze's text appears to similarly validate the second hypothesis. The monologic ethnography which is the product of the interviews and transcripts contained in the Bavarian documents reproduces the soul of the Platonic model of textual authority. An examination of the rest of Kunze's text will indicate the continued strength of the hypotheses.

Kunze uses Plato's combination of dialectic and figurative language to invoke Plato's notion of time as an

image of Truth and to affix that sense of Truth to his proposition that the Catholic Christianity myth's domination of seventeenth-century Bavaria results in the same effects seen in other myth-dominated cultures: the Bavarians reveal the opposed feelings of fear and inadequacy and affirmation and hope through the oppositions which make up their lives. The resulting rhetoric of opposition creates a Weltanschauung Kunze describes as a "stable order that distinguish[es] between superiority and inferiority, between heaven and hell, angels and demons."[213] The world of seventeenth-century Bavaria, therefore, is a world in which its Christian inhabitants' actions reflect symbolically Kenneth Burke's notion of the "negativistic principle of guilt implicit in the nature of order."[214] According to Kunze, the Bavarians' acts manifest their beliefs in the Catholic myth's ability to place a "halo" around their self-interests, thereby leading them to a sense of hope affirmed by their not having to "feel ashamed" of those acts: through the myth's power, becoming "wealthier and more powerful . . . [allows the Bavarian people to] avert the disaster that threatens [them]."[215]

Yet, these feelings of hope and affirmation are countered by the myth's power to evoke equally the feelings of inadequacy and fear. These feelings manifest themselves in Kunze's descriptions of the Bavarians' attempts to escape the myth's domination. The Bavarians

> plunged into dissipation, indulged in sumptuous feasts, reeled and reveled in dances that grew ever wilder--or else they hoarded, scrimped, and saved. Men cursed or mocked their Lord, or else they donned sackcloth and ashes . . . [and] prayed and did penance.[216]

The feelings of fear and inadequacy, however, reveal themselves more completely in the Bavarians' search for scapegoats, a search which makes concrete Burke's sense of "the sacrificial principle of victimage [in which] the line of exposition might be summed up thus: If order, then guilt; if guilt, then need for redemption; but any such 'payment' is victimage [scapegoating]."[217] The foreboding atmosphere which Kunze wraps around this world is characterized by the "fire and the stake," the focal points of a people "whose hearts are struck with terror [and as a result find] relief [by] stand[ing] in the midst of a seething mob . . . point[ing] to a 'culprit,' and . . . cry[ing] 'Burn him!'"[218] Moreover, these focal points are the source of the major portion of Kunze's text's title. The atmosphere is further clouded by Kunze's observation that "the relief gained by the threatened mob from the victims' screams and the crackling of the fire is short-lived. The dense smoke that rises from such conflagrations serves only to make the sky darker, to render the general menace all the more obvious."[219]

Kunze's recreation of seventeenth-century Bavarian culture, then, results in a picture of a culture dominated by a myth which generates a cycle of hope and affirmation and fear and inadequacy through its depiction of order. The culture's members thus follow the cycle; hope and affirmation promotes the development of knowledge and wise men, while "fear turns [the same] wise men into simpletons, makes the just unjust, the pious wicked, and the meek ferocious."[220] Further, by following this cycle created by a dominant myth, the reader comes to an understanding of "how [the Bavarian] legal authorities [could transform] the superstitious belief in witchcraft into a refined and dogmatic criminal code."[221]

The similarity between Kunze's opening paragraphs and the beginnings of Plato's Critias's and Plato's Timaeus's narratives emphasizes the relationship Plato describes between the model and the copy; one shares the soul of the other. More specifically, Kunze's beginning description of a Bavaria dominated by a myth evokes Plato's Critias's opposition between grace and damnation, between knowledge and belief, between the philosopher and the believer. In addition, Kunze's Preface creates an opposition between the ethnographer and his informants which mirrors Plato's Critias's oppositions. The inscribing ethnographer can historicize the informants' words through a created context inaccessible to the informants' perceptions of the

sensibles which make up his world just as Plato's Critias can historicize knowledge unattainable to his ancestors or Solon.

Kunze continues the rhetoric of opposition necessary for developing the premises supporting his proposition by opposing the worlds of the city-dwelling citizens of Munich, the Bavarian capital, the rural peasants, and the State's government. From the perspective of the citizens of Munich, the carts approaching the city carry the symbols of growing wealth and power: the "loads of spices, silks, and glasses from the celebrated commercial center of Nuremberg, sumptuous cloth from England and Flanders, wines from the Rhine and the Main."[222] From the perspective of the peasants "who [sit] chained together in [a] cart lurching and creaking its way toward [Munich's] Schwabing Gate,"[223] their conveyance carries a very different load: their "doleful thoughts and downcast hearts,"[224] for they are coming to Munich to die. From the perspecive of the state government, the cart filled with the "riffraff of the most disreputable kind, miscreants under arrest"[225] carries a third load: its cargo consists of "depraved and fiendish . . . individuals [who] had been on the most intimate terms with Satan."[226] Looming above these perceptions is the skyline of Munich in which "the twin onion towers of the Church of Our Lady, and the tower of St. Peter's, massive in its lower part,

and delicately proportioned higher up, [dominate] the other buildings and [show] the approaching stranger where the heart of the city [lies]."[227] Kunze's initial description of the setting of the upcoming witchcraft trial develops a set of oppositions that reveal the contradictory feelings of affirmation and hope and fear and inadequacy generated by the myth which hovers over everything in or around Munich and that provide a premise supporting Kunze's proposition concerning myth-dominated societies. Initially, at least, the actions of this world's inhabitants, as represented by their commercial, architectural, and legal developments, reflect the feelings generated by the myth.

Kunze continues to support this premise with oppositions reflecting the distinctions between the citizenry and the clergy and the citizenry and the court of Duke Maximilian I of Bavaria. Noting that in 1594 "complaints [by the common citizens of Munich] had been voiced in the town hall that the citizens were only a tiny group in comparison with the court and the clergy,"[228] Kunze phrases the Church's response in economic terms: the Church had recently hired "all the available bricklayers and carpenters, painters and masons . . . to build the Jesuit College."[229] Duke Maximilian responds similarly, stating that the court's presence in Munich attracts "foreigners: traders eager to sell their wares, artists

keen to display their talents, diplomats seeking to exert their influence. As a result, there [are] plenty of pickings for the townsfolk. . . ."[230] Nevertheless, the common citizens still felt their concerns were not being addressed. After all, Maximilian still has "whole streets of houses torn down in order to erect churches, monasteries, and mansions,"[231] edifices whose dominance over the remainder of the city reflect the presence of the dominant Catholic myth in both theological and secular aspects of the culture. Around the "churches, monasteries, and mansions," in a chaotic tumble whose juxtaposition with the more imposing buildings reveals the distinction between clergy and citizenry and between the court and the citizenry, lies the city in which

> the houses . . . are either pinched and narrow or broad and rambling; [they] follow the often tortuous lines of the streets, crammed together, seldom in regular rows. At one point a building towers above its neighbors, thrusting a gallery or a bay window far out into the street; at another point a workshop with its stall obstructs the thoroughfare at ground level.[232]

Scattered amongst this disorder are the city's "forty-two wine shops . . . [and] fourteen alehouses [whose scenes] of wild carousing"[233] highlight the feelings of fear and inadequacy in the city's population.

The omnipresence of the Catholic myth in Munich strengthens the distinction Kunze draws between the city's common inhabitants and the clergy and court. Kunze notes that "when the church bells [ring] out the Angelus in the evening, every [common] inhabitant in Munich [is] required by ducal decree to kneel down in the street."[234] This sense of separation and domination grows stronger in Kunze's linking together the realms of secular law and church attendance. Once a year, the common citizens of Munich must present to "the duke's officers . . . [their] certificates of confession; anyone who [fails] to go to confession [ends] up in jail."[235] In addition, this portion of the citizenry of Munich, as well as the rest of the common subjects in Bavaria, is subject to Duke Maximilian's council of state's Church-sanctioned duty of "'implement[ing] and maintain[ing] . . . public order and other matters of manuduction.'"[236] In other words, one of the principal tasks of the Duke's council of state, a court-like committee consisting of the Duke's chief justice, or "high commissioner of police,"[237] and other Church judiciary scholars, is to manage directly every aspect of the lives of the duke's common subjects. The council, therefore, elicits decrees

> against ostentatious dress and excessive drinking, against the marriage of young Catholics into Protestant communities, against the sale of

> nonCatholic books, against mixed bathing, against dancing in the evenings, against extravagant weddings, against card games and skittles, against an unbridled increase in swearing and blasphemy, against fortune telling and superstition, against vagrancy and highway robbery.[238]

Kunze further opposes the duke's council of state and the city government of Munich. Stating that "the ducal council treated the city council more and more frequently as an inferior authority,"[239] Kunze describes the state council's domination by the Catholic myth as the source of this distinction between superior and inferior. Kunze's depiction of the realm of criminal prosecution, as handled by local government and by the state council, clarifies this distinction.

According to Kunze, trials for criminals accused of breaking the laws set forth by the duke and his council of state were based on the Catholic myth's sanctions concerning the accumulation wealth and power. The trials, then, represent a means of making a profit. Thus, Kunze notes that "criminal proceedings [are carried out only when they offer] some prospect of profit."[240] Such a "prospect" occurs only when criminal charges are made against "delinquents who [own] property that might be confiscated."[241] This is the province of the state council; prosecution of peasants and others who have no property is relegated to

local authorities whose "judicial obligation . . . had to be reckoned on the debit side . . . an obligation to be evaded wherever possible."[242]

In this fashion, Kunze creates a Platonic framework in which a transcendental rhetoric of oppositions reveals the Catholic myth's domination, provides the supporting premises for Kunze's proposition that a culture dominated by a myth will manifest opposed feelings of hope and affirmation and fear and inadequacy through its adherents' actions, and portrays Kunze's textual authority. As the writer of the rules governing this framework, Kunze's voice becomes that of the single philosopher in this Bavarian world, a distinction which illustrates the chasm that separates the Platonic realms of "Being" and "Becoming" and soul and body, as well as the gulf which separates the ethnographer and his informants. In addition, when the reader remembers that these Bavarians, like Plato's Critias and Timaeus, are the product of the controlling finger of the ethnographer, Kunze's portrayal of his role as seventeenth-century Bavaria's recording secretary becomes the the portrait of the single guide capable of leading the reader to the truth concerning the relationship between cultures and dominant myths. Kunze the ethnographer, like Plato, knows therefore what is to come when he tells the tale of a family of peasants accused of the crime of witchcraft within this framework of

oppositions. As a result, Kunze's wielding of the signifying finger on Derrida's postcard makes concrete the notion of textual authority.

Telling the story of Paulus Pamb-Gamperl, his wife Anna, and their three sons Gumprecht, Michel, and Hansel, within the framework of oppositions provides Kunze with the sense of emotional coherence needed to tie the "dark cloud, drifting eastward with the wind across the blue sky of a summer afternoon"[243] with the "brewing storm" in Kunze's Preface. In addition, the story actualizes Kunze's syllogistically supported proposition, for this peasant family's plight reveals both the extent of the Catholic myth's domination of Bavaria and the Burkeian cycle of affirmation and hope and fear and inadequacy that derive from the myth's domination. More importantly, however, the the story's ability to tie coherently Kunze's transcendental rhetoric of oppositions used to depict the proposition empowers Kunze's authority.

Kunze begins the story of the Pamb-Gamperl family with the occasion from which the charge of witchcraft that is leveled against them develops:

> In Worth, a small town between Regensburg and Straubing . . . a thief by the name of Geindl [is] hanged in the summer of 1599. Before he dies he . . . [makes] a statement to the effect that the 'tinker lads' . . . abetted him in the

> murder of seven pregnant women. These tinker lads, Michel and Gumpprecht, [are] the adult sons of [Paulus Pamb-Gamperl].[244]

Kunze's speculation on the series of events that occur between the time Geindl makes his statement and the time the Pamb-Gamperl family is arrested in a barn in Tettenwang, a small village two prefectures north of Munich along the Danube River, underscores the oppositions Kunze creates between local governments and the state council. After hanging Geindl, the local authorities in Straubing write "to their colleagues in Munich, asking them to mount a search for those dangerous vagrants, the [Pamb-Gamperls]."[245] Somewhat later, Alexander von Hasling, the former soldier turned prefect of Abensberg and Altmannstein, the prefecture in which Tettenwang lies, receives the orders sent from Munich to the prefects along the Danube concerning the Pamb-Gamperls, who "allegedly [travel] about the Danube area . . . stealing from the peasants and killing wayfarers."[246] Hearing that the family is staying the night in a barn in Tettenwang, von Hasling has them arrested and reports the arrest to Munich. Yet, Kunze notes, because the peasant family is vagrant and thus has nothing of value to offset the costs of a criminal trial, von Hasling, realizing that the orders from Munich provide him with no other means of ridding himself of these "vagrants" other than finding

them guilty of murder and theft, begins to question them. The questions, however, reveal only the difficulty of disposing of the case satisfactorily because the family denies having committed any crime.[247] The economic and political pressures stemming the opposition between the local and State governments thus drive von Hasling to begin a cycle of victimage which ends only with the Pamb-Gamperls becoming scapegoats for the feelings of fear and inadequacy overwhelming Bavaria.

At this point, however, the peasant family is merely a scapegoat for von Hasling's feelings of fear and inadequacy caused by the state's domination of him. Resorting therefore to torture, a means of interrogation better suited than simple questioning to lead "to answers . . . calculated to support a judgment,"[248] von Hasling gained admissions of guilt for the crimes of murder, theft, and witchcraft. Thus, Kunze reports that von Hasling sends a "transcript [of his findings concerning the Pamb-Gamperls] to the council of state in Munich. He may have had an ulterior motive [,however], possibly seeing in the suggestive term witchcraft some hope of getting rid of this expensive and troublesome case."[249] The Pamb-Gamperl family thus finds itself shackled in the cart approaching the gates of Munich.

It is, however, during the trial in Munich that the engine of Kunze's proposition concerning myth-dominated

cultures in general and Bavaria in specific is truly engaged. For it is through this trial that Kunze's transcendental rhetoric of oppositions reaches its zenith. Through this rhetoric, the fear and inadequacy felt by the Bavarians and created by the Catholic myth's domination over the Bavarian culture lead the reader to understand fully Kunze's observation that the Pamb-Gamperl family's trial comes

> full cycle [because] a host of unsolved crimes and inexplicable disasters to cattle and crops throughout Bavaria [leads] . . . the council of state [to the idea] that the elusive perpetrators [of these crimes and disasters] should be deterred by a large-scale show trial, as soon as some of them fell into the hands of the law. It was then that news arrived of [the Pamb-Gamperls].[250]

Kunze's portrayal of the trial allows him to provide further support to his perception of the extent of the Catholic's myth domination of seventeenth-century Bavaria as well as the oppositions between the feelings of hope and affirmation and fear and inadequacy generated by the myth. The trial, therefore, additionally forms the background for Kunze's depiction of the oppositions between the Catholics and Lutherans and between the letter of law and its application; these oppositions form the frames

within which the Bavarians act. And it is through these acts that the myth's domination and its engendered feelings are seen.

The extent of the Catholic myth's domination of seventeenth-century Bavaria is best seen in the characters of Duke Maximilian and his forefathers and in the characters of Johann Baptist Fickler, the court scribe, and Johann Simon Wangereck, a member of the court of state and chief prosecutor during the witchcraft trial. Kunze describes Maximilian as

> a man who had never been young. After seven years in the care of nurses, he was surrounded by an entourage in the Spanish style while still a child, confined within the gloomy precincts of the Old Palace and subjected to a strict regime of tutors, preceptors, and confessors.[251]

It was through this "regime" that Maximilian's father, Duke William, hoped to "turn the skinny, pallid youth into an ideal prince."[252] By placing the young Maximilian in an environment which paralleled the conditions William's father, the continuously drunk and economically indulgent Duke Albrecht V, placed William in, William believed that Maximilian would learn "a capacity for hard work and self-control [that would] eradicate any trace of childish imagination by means of regular religious exercises and an unrelenting timetable of studies."[253] As a result, both

Maximilian and his father "sought refuge in a sentimental kind of religiosity, finding a substitute for forbidden childhood dreams in the officially approved mysticism of the saints."[254] The feelings of fear and inadequacy generated by the Catholic myth, then, find roots in Maximilian's and William's perception of hell as their "predilection for the carefree pleasures of the senses."[255]

Kunze observes that the contradictory feelings created by the Catholic myth led Albrecht to his one "fanatical concern," the Catholic faith. More specifically, the Burkeian cycle in which the feelings of hope and affirmation engendered by Catholicism's sense of order lead to the feelings of guilt and inadequacy promoted by that same sense of order drove Albrecht, following the religious settlement of Augsburg, to "hunt down the members of other faiths with a gusto that he otherwise evinced only in the chase."[256] This "gusto" is translated by both William and Maximilian into their using these other faiths, particularly the Lutherans, as scapegoats through which the entire cycle of feelings created by the Catholic myth could be exercised.

For Johann Baptist Fickler, the former tutor to young Maximilian and at the time of the witchcraft trial the court scribe, "there [is] only one authority in questions of morality, as in questions of law: the true religion [Catholicism]. Anything approved by that religion could

not be false, as far as he [is] concerned."[257] The feelings of affirmation and hope which derive from Fickler's perception the myth's orderly Truth further support his own ambition for wealth and power. Kunze notes that Fickler has "grandiose political plans"[258] for himself, an agenda which appears to him to be attainable by using the Lutheran heretics as a means of ingratiating himself to both William and Maximillian. He finds the occasion of traveling to the "neighboring principality of Pfalz-Neuburg" with young Maximilian particularly appropriate for inaugarating these plans, for Count Palatine Philipp Ludwig, the ruler of Pfalz-Neuburg, is a Lutheran who, Fickler tells William, "[has] sinister ulterior motives"[259] for inviting Maximilian to his notorious Protestant principality. Kunze states that "Fickler's insistent warnings [about the Lutherans help prevent the] catastrophic consequences for the Catholic party [that would have occurred] if [the count] . . . succeeded in corrupting Maximilian."[260]

Finally, Johann Simon Wangereck, a member of Duke Maximilian's council of state and chief prosecutor of the Pamb-Gamperl witchcraft trial, "never heard from the mouths of [his] father, [his] preacher, or [his] schoolmaster anything other than the virulent condemnation of the Lutheran heresy"[261] when he was a child. Later, as a student at the Jesuit college in Munich, this early

antiLutheran conditioning merged with "the fanatical religious faith propagated by the Jesuits."[262] Following his payment for his doctorate in criminal law from the University of Ingolstadt, Wangereck joined Duke William's council of state and became a member of the faction of the council known as "learned, upright, and zealous Catholics."[263] By the time of the Pamb-Gamperl witchcraft trial, therefore, Wangereck's "zealous" Catholicism and his "virulent condemnation" of the Lutheran faith led his interest in criminal law to the legal specialty of witchcraft. Kunze notes that Wangereck owns "a volume of Martin Delrio's legal manual on witchcraft entitled Disquisitiones Magicarum. From this and other relevant literature [Wangereck derives] the firm conviction that witches and sorcerers should be prosecuted ruthlessly."[264]

Kunze's development of these characters thus reveals the extent to which the Catholic myth dominates the men closest to the witchcraft trial, which serves as the focal point for Kunze's proposition concerning myth-dominated cultures. Several of Kunze's observations concerning Duke Maximilian and William, his father, further illuminate the Catholic myth's domination of Bavaria and thus futher empower his proposition. William's abdication of the ducal throne in favor of Maximilian, Kunze observes, did not allow William to find the sense of internal peace his stepping down was supposed to provide. Although he

continues to feed "twelve paupers at his table each day and, like Jesus, even wash[es] their feet occasionally . . . [and although] he chastis[es] himself and mortifie[s] his flesh, and [spends] many hours each day in prayer,"[265] the feelings of affirmation and hope William ascribes to "inner serenity" continue to elude him. Kunze says William believes the "machinations of sinister forces"[266] lie behind his failure, for William "had persecuted the heretics in his realm too zealously, shown too little mercy in burning witches, served the cause of Christ too plainly not to incur the bitter hatred of the Devil on himself and his family."[267]

Further, Kunze sees the young Maximilian's membership in the Munich Congregation of Mary, a Jesuit society founded as the "response on the part of the Jesuits to Protestant criticism of the adoration of the saints,"[268] as the factor which prompts Maximilian's change from the young prince, who believes in "moderation in all things," to the duke, who is "tormented with apocalyptic fears . . . [stemming from Maximilian's belief that] ultimately, when the time came, he would have to answer to his Creator for every one of his subjects.[269] The Congregation of Mary's education of the young Maximilian included the strong image of the prince as "a warrior in the cause of Christ who had to lead heretics 'back into the fold.'"[270] As a result, Duke Maximilian comes to see "the

shadows of the Thirty Years' War . . . the Turks [standing] no more than a few days' march from Vienna . . . [and] the [pope's] alliance with the king of France against the emperor"[271] as symbols of "the war between the kingdom of God and that of the Devil."[272] As a "warrior of Christ," then, it is Maximilian's duty to follow his father's direction and punish the "men [who] desert to the forces of the Evil One . . . [through] draconian punishment."[273]

Kunze points to the influence of Spain on Bavaria during Maximilian's reign as the final arena in which the Catholic myth's domination may be seen. According to Kunze,

> the spirit of Spain pervaded all of Europe . . . [to the extent that] Spanish taste governed fashion, literature, warfare, diplomacy, manners, and painting. The policy of restoration and reaction that was pursued in Bavaria [thus] took Spain as its model [in that] the public order measures . . . were essentially Spanish: a system of censorship, spying on subjects and officials, denunciations, penalties for emigration, [and] vicious persecution of heretics.[274]

Moreover, Kunze depicts Spanish imperialism as a series of "holy wars, hence bestial; an expression of God's will, hence fiendishly cruel; sanctified, hence ruthless; noble,

hence vile; honorable, hence predatory."[275] These same characteristics pervade the "wars" Pope Innocent III wages against Christians of other denominations and thus the development of the Inquisition as a tool for "locating and identifying the adversary."[276] The Inquisition, seen by Kunze as an ecclesiastical model for Maximilian's secular courts, therefore becomes the greatest symbol of the Catholic myth's domination of Maximilian's Bavaria. More importantly, the Inquisition functions as Kunze's means of actualizing his proposition, for it merges secular and ecclesiastical activities so that the myth's Burkeian cycle of victimage can be applied to the Pamb-Gamperl family's trial.

Kunze states that the sense of fear which drives the inquisitorial Pamb-Gamperl trial comes directly from the Catholic myth's abstract description of the "abyss" and its believers discerning that description in a series of signs that indicate that the myth's sense of order is collapsing. The emperor and the pope are "losing their aura of divinity . . . [indicating that] the ancient bonds of a social, legal, and moral kind [are] breaking down."[277] Reports of "people encounter[ing] death in person . . . fiery signs in the night sky . . . comets with tails that [sow] ruin . . . [and] skies [raining] down serpents, blood, and repulsive vermin"[278] reflect God's anger and the Revelation of St. John. Moreover,

these signs reawaken the Bavarians' "personification of misfortune" which holds that "demons [stand] around the sickbed, demons [guide] the woodsman's axe into his leg, demons [slay] the newborn child, demons [grin] from every corner, [lurk] behind every tree. [Demons strike] down cattle in the meadow, and [cause] the river to burst its banks."[279] Church instruction shows the Bavarians that the only means of combatting these evil hordes is through the hopeful and affirmative actions of "prayer and self-denial, [invoking] the saints, the sign of the cross, and [sprinkling] holy water,"[280] and, according to Maximilian and his council of state, through the tracking down and punishing fearsomely the inadequately few Satanic collaborators who are assisting the collapse of order. Maximilian thus demands that his council of state "accept his father's definition of witchcraft . . . in a literal sense."[281] According to this definition,

> anyone who practice[s] soothsaying or offer[s] to find stolen property [is] liable to be suspected of witchcraft. Anyone who inflict[s] disease on men or beasts [is] accutely suspicious . . . but suspicion . . . also [falls] on anyone who cure[s] a patient whom doctors had failed to restore to health. Witches [are] also capable of conjuring up 'strange and spurious diabolical apparitions and curious specters'; anyone who

> boast[s] of such exploits [is] likely to be arrested. Anyone who call[s] on the Devil when he [is] angry [is] highly suspicious, as [is] anyone who wish[es] another person evil, if that person subsequently suffer[s] some misfortune.[282]

Further, Maximilian adds, anyone who deviates "from the true faith [is] prey to Satan [for] in the war between saint and devil, no one could be neutral."[283] Maximilian thus reaffirms Augustine's perception of the world of men as "beset by demons and spirits of darkness who [tempt and seduce] them with evil lusts and favorable opportunities."[284]

In the case of the Pamb-Gamperl family, a group whom Johann Wangereck portrays in his reports to Maximillian as vagrant, Lutheran "nobodies" suspected of the "particularly evil offenses" of murder, robbery, and, above all witchcraft, "these grave and secret offenses" that are incapable of detection and solution "by the usual methods of proof"[285] demand that the ordinary system of laws be reinterpreted so that the family's guilt can be clearly demonstrated. Through Wangereck's belief that "if . . . the law [is] construed in the right spirit, then there [is] no difficulty in complying with it,"[286] the law prohibiting arrested persons from being "prompted" to answer questions in a particular way is reinterpreted on the basis of another law which states "'in the case of

particularly grave and heinous offenses . . . it is permissible to depart from customary procedural and legal principles.'"[287] As a result, under the sanction of both Catholic myth and secular law and through the direction of Maximilian's council of state, Sebastian Georg, the warden of the Falcon Tower prison in which the peasant family is jailed, tortures the Pamb-Gamperls, obtains the confessions the council of state desires, and paves the way for the public execution of the convicted witch and her family of sorcerers. In addition, the acts of torture mandated by the council of state provide an outlet for the Catholic myth's domination of Maximilian and his council of state, for the contradictory feelings of hope and affirmation and fear and inadequacy generated by the myth are expressed through the torture and defeat of the representatives of Satan and eased through the brutal suffering of the representatives of the challenges to theological and secular order making their appearance at this time. Further, the laws' reinterpretation by Wangereck puts into motion once more the Burkeian cycle of victimage through which the massed spectators of the Pamb-Gamperl family's execution move as they temporarily affirm the hope the Catholic myth offers by placing their feelings of fear and inadequacy in a mangled and burned scapegoat. Finally, through the trial and its result, Kunze's use of Plato's Timaeus's method of syllogistically examining a series of posed

oppositions in order that premises supporting a proposition may be developed receives its final affirmation. Most importantly, the Pamb-Gamperl family's torture, conviction, and execution highlights Kunze's position as Plato's textual artisan whose "harmonious" creation can only be "undone" by evil, as Plato's philosopher whose voice is the only voice capable of directing the reader to Truth, and thus as the inheritor of Plato's notion of textual authority.

A return to the questions posed at the beginning of chapter two of this study of the relationship between Platonic method and authority as revealed in the "Meno," the "Phaedo," and the "Timaeus," and the three major genres of ethnography, which I have called the Realist, Interpretive/Translative, and Fictive genres, reveals several interesting answers to these questions. I asked first what happens if the question ethnographers have asked concerning the relationship between Platonism and ethnography changes from "How does Platonism affect ethnography?" to "How does Platonism create ethnography?" More specifically, I asked what results from seeing Platonism not as a set of structural motifs which are present in or which must be avoided by ethnographic texts but as the source of ethnography itself. The answer to this question must be addressed in three parts, for each of the ethnographic genres addresses Platonic method and

authority somewhat differently. As represented by Bronislaw Malinowski's Sex and Repression in Savage Society, Anthony F.C. Wallace's The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, and Marjorie Esman's Henderson, Louisiana, the ethnographers writing in the Realist genre rely on Plato's distinction between the body and the soul as developed in the "Meno" to separate the perspectives of the ethnographer and the studied culture. Further, these ethnographers rely on Plato's portrayal of the soul as the seat of knowledge and the Platonic definition of the philosopher as the sole individual capable of attaining and understanding this knowledge as a means of displacing competing depictions of the "reality" of a culture, controlling the directions of their monologues, and personifying the abstract nature of authority. Moreover, the Realist ethnographers embrace the method of causal reasoning Plato uses to demonstrate the distinction between the body and the soul, the soul as the seat of knowledge, and the definition of the philosopher to use theory as a means of manipulating the studied culture. Finally, these ethnographers rely on Plato's use of writing to create textually the diachronic flavor of time and history necessary for a sense of Truth. As a result, Realist textual authority may be characterized as the textually portrayed writer whose discourse reflects the ideology of Plato's method and the personal domination of Plato's philosopher.

The Interpretive/Translative ethnographers, represented by Clifford Geertz's The Religion of Java, David M. Schneider's American Kinship, and Vinigi L. Grottanelli's The Python Killer, similarly accept Plato's continued distinctions between the body and the soul as developed in the "Phaedo" to separate the perspectives of the ethnographer and the studied culture. Further, these ethnographers rely on Plato's continued portrayal of the soul as the seat of knowledge and the extended Platonic definition of the philosopher as the sole individual capable of attaining and understanding this knowledge as a means of personifying the abstract nature of authority and controlling the directions of their monologues. Avoiding the geometrical form of causal reasoning embraced by the writers in the Realist genre, the Interpretive/Translative ethnographers embrace Plato's later use of rhetorically-generated oppositions. When examined syllogistically, these oppositions are employed by Plato in the "Phaedo" to demonstrate the distinction between the body and the soul; to depict the soul as the seat of knowledge; and to provide the definition of the philosopher. The Interpretive/Translative ethnographers similarly employ these oppositions as sources of symbol systems which create the premises needed to lead to a proposition. This proposition, in turn, functions as the focal point around which the ethnographers' interpretation and translations develop and

as the means of manipulating the studied culture. Finally, like the Realist ethnographers, the Interpretive/Translative ethnographers accede to Plato's use of writing to create textually the diachronic flavor of time and history necessary for a sense of Truth. As a result, Interpretive/Translative textual authority may be characterized in the same fashion as Realist textual authority: it is the textually portrayed writer whose discourse continues to reflect the ideology of Plato's method and the personal domination of Plato's philosopher.

The Fictive ethnographers--represented by Jane Kramer's The Last Cowboy, John McPhee's Basin and Range, and Michael Kunze's Highroad to the Stake--like the Realist and Interpretive/Translative ethnographers, rely on Plato's continued distinction between the body and the soul as it is developed in the "Timaeus" to separate the perspectives of the ethnographer and the studied culture. Further, like the Realist and Interpretive/Translative ethnographers, the Fictive ethnographers depend on Plato's portrayal of the soul as the seat of knowledge and the Platonic definition of the philosopher as the sole individual capable of attaining and understanding this knowledge as a means of controlling the direction of their monologues. Moreover, like the Interpretive/Translative ethnographers, the writers of Fictive ethnographies employ rhetorically-generated oppositions that, when examined

syllogistically, develop premises needed to support a proposition which, in turn, functions as the focal point from which the ethnographer's theory may manipulate the studied culture. But where the Interpretive/Translative ethnographers use the oppositions as a means of propagating symbol systems, the Fictive ethnographers use the oppositions to recreate Plato's metaphorical rhetoric of transcendence as a means of actualizing their proposition within a framework created by the telling of a tale characteristic of the studied culture. As a result, Fictive textual authority may be characterized in the same fashion as Interpretive/Translative and Realist textual authority: it remains the textually portrayed writer whose discourse reflects the ideology of Plato's method and the personal domination of Plato's philosopher.

Despite the fact that a reader might argue that the world created in Plato's "Timaeus" is the first ethnography in that its focus on a cultural myth shows how a specific culture views the world around it, on the basis of the analyses in chapters two through four, the first question I posed at the beginning of chapter two must be negatively answered. Plato's dialogues do not "create" ethnography. The various ethnographic genres, however, do appear to be reapplications of the Platonic dialogues, a perspective which explains why Marcus and Cushman conclude their study of ethnographies as texts by stating,

"[Experimental ethnographies], however interesting the historic conditions which gave rise to them, are refinements and represent an essentially involutionary period in the twentieth century history of realism."[288] Such a perspective also echoes Kenneth Burke's observation on Karl Mannheim's sociological study, Ideology and Utopia. Burke notes that Mannheim's book "grounds its analysis in the study of chiliastic doctrines. . . . We thus have more the feel of an ultimate order [because the reader] can discern here the elements, broken and reassembled, of a Platonic dialogue."[289]

The second question I posed at the beginning of chapter two asks, "What happens to ethnographic textual authority if ethnography is viewed as a creation of Platonism?" If ethnography is not a creation of Platonism but is, rather, a "reassembly" or a reapplication of Plato's methods as developed in the "Meno," the "Phaedo," and the "Timaeus," then the answer to the question concerning textual authority is that it, too, is a reapplication of Plato's notion of authority. It has, therefore, the same dominative characteristics I have described above, for textual authority in the ethnographic genres analyzed in the preceding chapters appears to remain the textually portrayed writer whose discourse reflects the ideology of Plato's method and the personal domination of Plato's philosopher.

Marcus and Cushman's conclusion concerning the developments resulting from ethnographers' viewing ethnographies as texts and Kenneth Burke's observation of Karl Mannheim's text, besides echoing my conclusions, prompt yet another question concerning ethnographic textual authority: Is it possible to devise a new notion of ethnographic textual authority that is not based on a Platonic model? The final chapter in this study proposes such a notion.

Notes

[1] Jacques Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987) 28.

[2] Stephen A. Tyler, "The Poetic Turn in Postmodern Anthropology: The Poetry of Paul Friedrich," American Anthropologist 6 (1984): 328.

[3] Tyler 328.

[4] Barbara Myerhoff and Jay Ruby, introduction, A Crack in the Mirror: Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology, ed. Jay Ruby (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1982) 2.

[5] Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) 181.

[6] Jacques Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel," Difference in Translation, trans. Joseph F. Graham, ed. Joseph F. Graham (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985) 218.

[7] Tyler 329.

[8] Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: U of California P, 1966) 26.

[9] Tyler 331.

[10] Steven Webster, in "Ethnography as Story-telling," Dialectical Anthropology 8 (1983): 185-206, for example, applauds this direction in ethnography,

stating, "now, the storyteller need no longer be alienated from his own history, the necessary basis of his historical concern, recognized or not, and the only basis of truth possibly, however problematically, free of false-consciousness. The storyteller, adventurer in time or space, historian or anthropologist, [is] no longer a mere ghostly and ahistorical negative presence pursuing a chimerical objectification. The renewed hermeneutic restore[s] the social scientist's narrative role, an ordinary storyteller alive again in the mundane world, telling a story about a past experience reconstructed by his present and thus constructing the future" (191). Stephen Tyler, in "The Poetic Turn in Postmodern Anthropology: The Poetry of Paul Friedrich," American Anthropologist 6 (1984): 328-36, echoes Webster's lauding of this change in direction in ethnography in his discussion of poetry as anthropology. Noting that "the unfamiliar ways of other cultures . . . supply the content and guide the metaphors of many . . . poems" (332), Tyler develops his analysis of the poetry of Paul Freidrich as an example of postmodern anthropology to the point that Tyler recognizes all language is "enescapably [sic] metaphoric" and reduces the relation between hypotactic style and scientific objectivity in Realist and Interpretive/Translative ethnographic texts to a nightmarish image of death: "The . . . dream of a 'language beyond metaphor' is at best only a dream, at

worst, a death urge to annihilate the self and somehow to get beyond language to that transcendent reality that language and ego obscure" (334).

[11] Jacques Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987) 426.

[12] Melford E. Spiro, Oedipus in the Trobriands (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982) 2.

[13] Spiro 17.

[14] Spiro 20.

[15] Spiro 92.

[16] Derek Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984) 4.

[17] Freeman 5.

[18] Freeman 56.

[19] Freeman 60.

[20] Freeman 76.

[21] Freeman xii-xiii.

[22] Freeman 5.

[23] Freeman 6.

[24] Freeman 294.

[25] Freeman 79.

[26] John Van Maanen, Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1988) 127.

[27] Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the

Critic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983) 216.

[28] Plato, "Timaeus," The Collected Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1969) 17a.

[29] Plato, "Timaeus" 19c.

[30] Plato, "Timaeus" 20a.

[31] Plato, "Timaeus" 20a.

[32] Plato, "Timaeus" 19e.

[33] Plato, "Timaeus" 21e.

[34] Plato, "Timaeus" 22b.

[35] Plato, "Timaeus" 23a-b.

[36] Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida, and Writing (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988) 9.

[37] Plato, "Timaeus" 26c.

[38] Plato, "Timaeus" 27a.

[39] Plato, "Timaeus" 27d-28a.

[40] Plato, "Timaeus" 28b-c.

[41] Plato, "Timaeus" 20a.

[42] Plato, "Timaeus" 29e-30a.

[43] Plato, "Timaeus" 30a.

[44] Plato, "Timaeus" 30a.

[45] Plato, "Timaeus" 30b.

[46] Plato, "Timaeus" 30c.

[47] Plato, "Timaeus" 31a.

[48] Plato, "Timaeus" 47a-c.

[49] Plato, "Timaeus" 37c.

[50] Plato, "Timaeus" 37d-e.

[51] Plato, "Timaeus" 38a.

[52] Plato, "Timaeus" 38b.

[53] Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 17.

[54] Burke 50.

[55] Plato, "Timaeus" 26c.

[56] Jane Kramer, The Last Cowboy (New York: Harper and Row, 1977) x.

[57] Plato, "Timaeus" 22a.

[58] Kramer viii.

[59] Kramer ix.

[60] Plato, "Timaeus" 22a-b.

[61] Kramer ix.

[62] Plato, "Timaeus" 22b.

[63] Kramer viii.

[64] Kramer ix.

[65] Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society ed. Joseph R. Gusfield (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989) 206.

[66] Kramer 1-2.

[67] Kramer 2.

[68] Kramer 2.

[69] Kramer 2-3.

[70] Kramer 3.

[71] Kramer 3.

[72] Kramer 2.

[73] Kramer 3.

[74] Kramer 3.

[75] Kramer 3-4.

[76] Kramer 4.

[77] Kramer 4.

[78] Kramer 4.

[79] Kramer 4.

[80] Kramer 4.

[81] Kramer 4-5.

[82] Kramer 3.

[83] Kramer 5.

[84] Kramer 5.

[85] Kramer 5.

[86] Kramer 5.

[87] Kramer 6.

[88] Kramer 7.

[89] Kramer 8.

[90] Kramer 9.

[91] Kramer 9.

[92] Kramer 9.

[93] Kramer 10.

[94] Plato, "Timaeus" 34c.

[95] Kramer 12.

[96] Kramer 13.

[97] Kramer 14.

[98] Kramer 15.

[99] Kramer 15.

[100] Kramer 15.

[101] Kramer 17.

102 Kramer 19-20.

103 Kramer 21-22.

104 Kramer 22.

105 Kramer 22-23.

106 Kramer 23.

107 Kramer 29.

108 Kramer 26.

109 Kramer 44.

110 Kramer 55.

111 Kramer 56.

112 Kramer 81.

113 Kramer 78.

114 Kramer 83.

115 Kramer 84.

116 Kramer 9.

117 Kramer 85.

118 Kramer 46.

119 Kramer 84.

120 Kramer 46.

121 Kramer 46.

122 Kramer 138.

123 Kramer 17.

124 Kramer 140.

125 Kramer 141.

126 Kramer 141.

127 Kramer 143.

128 Kramer 143.

129 Kramer 144.

130 Kramer 147.

131 Kramer 148.

132 Kramer 148.

133 Kramer 148.

134 Plato, "Timaeus" 40d.

135 Plato, "Timaeus" 41a.

136 Plato, "Timaeus" 28c.

137 Kramer 33.

138 Kramer 41.

139 Kramer 41.

140 Van Maanen 136.

141 Van Maanen 132-33.

142 Plato, "Timaeus" 90b.

143 John McPhee, Basin and Range (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1981) 3.

144 McPhee 3-4.

145 McPhee 4.

146 McPhee 9.

147 McPhee 10.

148 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: U of California P, 1969) 203.

149 McPhee 30.

150 McPhee 81.

151 McPhee 24-5.

152 McPhee 42.

153 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures

(New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1973) 219.

154 John S. Nelson, "Political Foundations for the Rhetoric of Inquiry," The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry, ed. Herbert W. Simons (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990) 273.

155 McPhee 34.

156 McPhee 45.

157 McPhee 45.

158 McPhee 45.

159 Plato, "Timaeus" 50a-b.

160 McPhee 30-31.

161 McPhee 49.

162 Plato, "Timaeus" 30c.

163 Plato, "Timaeus" 28c.

164 McPhee 52.

165 McPhee 53.

166 McPhee 53.

167 McPhee 56-7.

168 McPhee 52.

169 McPhee 55.

170 Plato, "Timaeus" 65b.

171 Plato, "Timaeus" 53b.

172 McPhee 55.

173 McPhee 61.

174 McPhee 61.

175 McPhee 61-62.

176 Plato, "Timaeus" 92c.

177 McPhee 63.

178 McPhee 66.

179 McPhee 67.

180 McPhee 67.

181 McPhee 68.

182 McPhee 69.

183 McPhee 69-70.

184 McPhee 79.

185 McPhee 77.

186 McPhee 70.

187 McPhee 84.

188 McPhee 85.

189 McPhee 88-89.

190 McPhee 88.

191 McPhee 89.

192 McPhee 89-90.

193 McPhee 91.

194 McPhee 91, 93.

195 McPhee 94.

196 McPhee 95.

197 McPhee 106-07.

198 McPhee 100.

199 McPhee 149.

200 McPhee 150.

201 McPhee 150.

202 McPhee 154.

203 McPhee 157.

204 McPhee 159.

205 McPhee 162.

206 McPhee 162.

207 McPhee 162.

208 McPhee 163.

209 McPhee 201.

210 McPhee 201.

211 Michael Kunze, Highroad to the Stake: A Tale of Witchcraft, trans. William E. Yuill (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987) x-xi.

212 Kunze ix-x.

213 Kunze ix.

214 Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society 280.

215 Kunze x.

216 Kunze x.

217 Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society 280.

218 Kunze x.

219 Kunze x.

220 Kunze xi.

221 Kunze xii.

222 Kunze 3.

223 Kunze 4.

224 Kunze 4.

225 Kunze 3.

226 Kunze 5.

227 Kunze 4.

228 Kunze 7.

229 Kunze 7.

230 Kunze 7.

231 Kunze 7.

232 Kunze 8.

233 Kunze 8.

234 Kunze 8.

235 Kunze 8.

236 Kunze 21.

237 Kunze 20.

238 Kunze 21.

239 Kunze 7.

240 Kunze 14.

241 Kunze 14.

242 Kunze 14.

243 Kunze 415.

244 Kunze 14.

245 Kunze 14.

246 Kunze 14.

247 Kunze 15.

248 Kunze 16.

249 Kunze 16.

250 Kunze 365.

251 Kunze 88.

252 Kunze 88.

253 Kunze 89.

254 Kunze 90.

255 Kunze 88.

256 Kunze 89.

257 Kunze 243.

258 Kunze 67.

259 Kunze 67.

260 Kunze 67.

261 Kunze 30.

262 Kunze 31.

263 Kunze 33.

264 Kunze 34.

265 Kunze 122.

266 Kunze 123.

267 Kunze 124.

268 Kunze 91.

269 Kunze 208.

270 Kunze 92.

271 Kunze 209.

272 Kunze 208.

273 Kunze 209.

274 Kunze 109-10.

275 Kunze 112.

276 Kunze 112.

277 Kunze 168-69.

278 Kunze 166.

279 Kunze 167-68.

280 Kunze 168.

281 Kunze 206.

282 Kunze 205.

283 Kunze 303.

284 Kunze 329.

285 Kunze 359-60.

286 Kunze 84.

287 Kunze 86.

288 George E. Marcus and Dick Cushman, "Ethnographies as Texts," Annual Review of Anthropology 11 (1982): 64.

289 Kenneth Burke, Symbols and Society 207.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: RHETORIC, SOPHISTIC, AND A POSTPLATONIC VIEW OF ETHNOGRAPHIC TEXTUAL AUTHORITY

" . . . in the genealogy of texts there is a first text, a sacred prototype, a scripture, which readers always approach through the text before them, either as petitioning suppliants or as initiates amongst many in a sacred chorus supporting the central patriarchal text."[1]

The early Greeks were aware of the nature of authority and believed it to be an integral portion of the rhetorical situation. Plato, for example, in the Phaedrus states that authority may only be obtained when the rhetor "has the capacity to declare to himself with complete perception, in the presence of another, that here is the man [my italics] . . . [and] he must apply this kind of speech in this sort of manner in order to obtain persuasion for this kind of activity. . . ."[2] A description of authority mirroring Plato's occurs centuries later in David Trueblood's claim that "because sense experience is so open to error . . . we need to listen to those qualified to know."[3] Both men--explicitly in the case of Plato, implicitly in the case of Trueblood--emphasize the relationships between authority and discourse, authority and speaker, authority and audience, and authority and

persuasion. Moreover, both men--once again explicitly in the case of Plato, and implicitly in the case of Trueblood--reveal the nature of textual authority as it distinguishes itself in ethnographic text. Plato's notion of the writer's "complete perception" bases itself on a dominative rhetoric that displaces competing claims, objectifies the subject of its concern through its application of theories, definitions, and examples, and hegemonically represses voices of dissent through a monologue disguised as dialogue. Jasper Neel describes the manipulative nature of this rhetoric, noting that there are three rules of Platonic discourse: a "definition of terms," which precludes competing definitions through the definition's association with the single voice capable of attaining knowledge; a "'knowledge of the truth,'" which is mated with a textualized ideology useable only by that single voice; and an "ability to divide and collect," which stems from that voice's distanced perspective.[4] As the previous chapters have indicated, this rhetoric of Plato's is the "patriarchal source" of ethnographic discourse in the Realist, Interpretive/Translative, Representative, and Fictive genres. Further, Plato's concept of the "another," whose presence is required for textual authority to develop, refers directly to his hegemonic finger's target, Socrates, and thus to the ethnographer writing in these genres, the cultural object of the

ethnographer's inscribing finger, and to the resulting expectations of readers of these ethnographies. Edward Said describes these readers as "no longer simply [interested in] 'understanding': now the [readers expect the] Orient . . . to perform, its power . . . enlisted on the side of 'our' values, civilization, interests, goals."[5] In addition, Plato's resounding "here is the man" illustrates the ethnographer writing in one of the genres as the sole guide to truth in either the context of an exotic "other" culture or as the author of another context in which a culture is used to actualize other agendas and illustrate the objectivized subject of the ethnographer's discourse. Finally, Plato's decree concerning "<u>this</u> kind of speech in <u>this</u> sort of manner . . . to obtain persuasion for <u>this</u> kind of activity" establishes the persuasive nature of ethnographic discourse in these genres. For if this ethnographic writing is to be recognized <u>as</u> ethnographic writing by a reading audience of ethnographers, its discourse must contain some textual features permeated by authority.

Nonetheless, neither Plato nor Trueblood nor Neel answer some rather troublesome questions deriving from the reliance on Plato's notion of textual authority. Are these genres of ethnographic discourse either imbued with a sense of authority or reflective of it? Can such texts obtain or lose authority? What does a reader perceive

that creates or reinforces the authority of these texts? Finally, to what extent is the persuasive power of the texts reliant upon textual authority?

Answers to these questions, although implied in the preceding chapters' analyses, are based on a definition of textual authority that remains as yet unspecified. Aristotle, for example, implies merely that authority is an "antecedent impression,"[6] an a-rhetorical concept. George Kennedy asserts that authority is something "a Homeric orator must have,"[7] one of the "basic modes of proof of Judeo-Christian rhetoric,"[8] and, according to Augustine, a source of knowledge.[9] Finally, Edward Corbett describes authority as a type of testimony useful in arguments concerning "the conduct of human affairs."[10] It seems then that the general concept of textual authority, as seen by some leading rhetoricians, is a quality existing outside a rhetorical situation but necessary for the acceptance of knowledge claims and representative of the dominion of the Judeo-Christian God. Yet, this definition blurs the distinction between coercion and persuasion, a difference Leonard Krieger insists is crucial for "the understanding of our own times and for the history of political and social ideas."[11] Jacques Derrida's perception of textual authority as a "filial" relationship reveals a similar diminishing of the difference between coercion and persuasion. In describing the authority

generated through the relationship between Plato and Socrates, Derrida paints a picture of manipulation and deceit:

> Plato's dream: to make Socrates write, and to make him write what he [Plato] wants, his last command, his will. To make him write what he wants by letting (lassen) him write what he wants. Thereby becoming Socrates and his father, therefore his own grandfather . . . and killing him. He teaches him to write. He teaches him to live.[12]

Similarly, Michel Foucault emphasizes the forceful nature of authority's powers of exclusion, citing these powers as the primary cause for the change in Greek perceptions of discourse. Whereas for the sophists truth lay in what discourse was, for Plato truth lay in what discourse said:

> For . . . the sixth century Greek poets, true discourse--in the meaningful sense--inspir[ed] respect and terror, to which all were obliged to submit, because it held sway over all and was pronounced by men who spoke as of right, according to ritual, meted out justice and attributed to each his rightful share; it prophesied the future, not merely announcing what was going to occur, but contributing to its actual event. . . . And yet, a century later. . . . [a] division

> emerged between Hesiod and Plato . . . ; it was a new division for, henceforth, true discourse was no longer considered precious and desirable, since it had ceased to be discourse linked to the exercise of power.[13]

In other words, the sophistic view of discourse as a holy object wielded within a ritualized context was excluded (Derrida's "killed") by Plato's view of discourse as the means to truth wielded within contexts developed by itself. As a result of this sophistic demise, textual authority became a means of production; it became the controlling, selecting, organizing, and redistributing actions of the authors of truth; and it is seen in the ethnographies analyzed in the previous chapters. Such a definition of textual authority, however, creates a problem, for by its very nature coercion denies rhetoric. As a result, the changes in the textual choices made by ethnographers writing in the these genres concerning the cultural materials selected, the methods of arranging that material, and the styles used to present the material will not lead to a less dominative sense of textual authority. Chapters two through four of this study show this to be the case.

Is there, then, a means of reemphasizing the critical difference between coercion and persuasion, of bridging the gulf between sophistic and Platonic senses of

discourse, of redefining textual authority so that ethnographers writing in the Realist, Interpretive/Translative, Representative, or Fictive genres may move away from the problems inherent in their Platonic heritage? In short, is there a means of understanding how textual authority may function rhetorically?

Section I

Edward Corbett notes that "in an age characterized by a scientific attitude and a democratic spirit, men are temperamentally not as disposed as they once were to be impressed and swayed by the voice of authority. . . ."[14] Several hypotheses on the complexion of ethnographic textual authority can be made from Corbett's observation. First, ethnographic authority is somehow tied to the ethos of a rhetor. George Kennedy traces such a connection, stating that in pre-Socratic Greece an orator's authority derived from what "he [had] done, [from] how he carrie[d] himself, [from] what sanctions he [brought] to support his words."[15] In a worldview focusing on neumena rather than on an external "force," therefore, textual authority becomes the capacity to evoke a voluntary submission to acts and opinions--through such phenomena as degrees in anthropology, familiarity with exotic culture, adherence to accepted ethnographic methodology, and the ability to write well--over and above the suasory force inherent in

those acts and opinions themselves. Second, Corbett's "scientific attitude" implies the existence of a single certain basis for what ethnographers know. As Kenneth Burke suggests, a simplistic dialectic underlies such a view, resulting in the warrant that true knowledge can be achieved only by pursuing the scientific method; all else is primitive magic.[16] In this world view, then, textual authority becomes the capacity to evoke submission to acts and opinions through the suasory force inherent in the "truth" of those acts and opinions. Third, Corbett's men who are indisposed to the "voice of authority" hint at the possible existence of a Hobbesian world in which absolute state power is the only barrier against a life that is nasty, brutish, and short. In this world view, textual authority becomes the capacity to evoke submission to acts and opinions through political power.

Unfortunately, although these descriptions of ethnographic textual authority allow for other means of approaching the question of what ethnographic textual authority is, they do nothing for the question of how textual authority functions rhetorically in ethnographies. A simplistic response to this second inquiry might indicate the possibility of different rhetorics, each developing from the different definitions of authority. But a moment of consideration would show how messy such a response would be. The potential for using different appeals based

on different definitions of authority would be contingent upon the rhetor's ability to change the world view of an audience. For example, Clifford Geertz describes religious authority as residing in a culture's method of conceiving the supernatural:

> In tribal religions authority lies in the persuasive power of traditional imagery; in mystical ones in the apodictic force of supersensible experience; in charismatic ones in the hypnotic attraction of an extraordinary personality.[17]

Kenneth Burke presages Geertz's explanation of the source of religious authority in his discussion of Christianity:

> In the first chapter of Genesis, the stress is upon the creative fiat as a means of classification. It says in effect, 'What hath God wrought (by his word)?' The second chapter's revised account of the Creation shifts the emphasis to matters of dominion, saying in effect 'What hath God ordained (by his words)?'[18]

Plainly, religious authority seems to be supernatural in origin and granted, either by a metaphorical association with traditional images (e.g., in Christianity with images of the cross, the fish, and so forth), by contact with supersensible experience, or by accepting the Weberian premise that charisma entails supernatural favor. Yet, a rhetor could not effectively use the authority of

traditional images in a worldview dominated by the authority of the charismatic, nor could the rhetor use the authority of the direct contact with a supernatural force in a world view controlled by the authority of the traditional images.

Moreover, the different-rhetorics-for-different-conceptions-of-textual-authority model restricts authority to personified or official residences, effectively preventing texts, rituals, types of explanation, justifications, reasons, or particular real or ideal social arrangements from taking on authoritative dispositions. Wayne Booth observes that human beings "justify [critical claims for authority] only when they manage to get themselves embodied in a text."[19] Grant Webster magnifies Booth's statement in his discussion of the varied authoritative characteristics of the literary "charter." According to Webster, such a document entails four different authoritative features: a social grant "from an authority, a sovereign which parallels critics' general acceptance of theoretical authority"; a "licensing authority under which organizations are set up and activities carried out"; an intellectual authority "under which a critical school or community defines and organizes itself"; and a temporal authority which "is a grant of authority to pursue a specified and otherwise forbidden activity within a specific historical context that is limited spatially and

socially."[20] Such a text, in which rituals, types of explanations, justifications, reasons, or particular real or ideal social arrangements would be described, would have no authoritative place in the model described above. Instead, the model would become an after-the-fact means of describing structural elements of textual authority perceived within the text. Finally, the model fails to consider problems of decision making. Richard Rorty notes that "there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society uses in one or another area."[21] In other words, decisions on knowledge claims are made from the basis of how a given society justifies that decision. The different-rhetorics-for-different-conceptions-of-textual-authority model and world view, however, provides no way of describing these means of justification, for these perceptions of textual authority, as described by the model, exist outside of any discourse developed by the model.

Ethnographic textual authority, therefore, remains unexplainable rhetorically. The previous method of attempting to show how a definition of textual authority leads to a perception of authority as rhetoric creates the problem. What would happen if the method was reversed so that a definition of rhetoric provides a means of perceiving ethnographic textual authority as rhetoric?

Section II

For the sophists of the fifth century B.C., the concept of rhetoric, although not codified, was an important one. It was through language that reality was made apprehensible by means of the relationships between the names of things, the structures of language, and the structures of the things. According to G. B. Kerferd, the rhetorical aspect of this notion of language and reality is found in "setting two names against each other in order to abstract from them the basic sense which they share and to ascertain those subtleties of meaning in which they differ. [The sophists, in other words, were] asking not 'what is x?', but 'in what respect is x different from y?'"[22]

Aristotle's description of rhetoric as the "faculty [power] of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion"[23] and Ernesto Grassi's definition of rhetoric as "indicative [discourse] . . . which [forms] the basis of . . . rational thought,"[24] when added to the context of the sophists' perspective, provide a useful starting point in addressing the relationship between ethnographic textual authority and rhetoric. These descriptions illuminate the inherent problem with which all three contend: How does one gain the confidence and support of readers who possess the power of judgment? The sophists found their solution in discerning

the relationship between words and "what is the case [not as] . . . simply a presentation in words [but as] . . . a representation, involving a considerable degree of reorganisation in the process."[25] In other words, rhetoric becomes a means of using logos to operate on opinion in order to appeal to knowledge. Similarly, Aristotle's solution lies in the relationship between words and opinions, an association described in his functions of rhetoric. According to Lane Cooper, these uses are the prevention of the "triumph of fraud and injustice . . . instruct[ion] when scientific instruction is of no avail . . . argument[ation in order to deal with] both sides of a case . . . [and] defen[se through] reason."[26]

Finally, Grassi finds his solution in his distinction between knowledge and opinion. Grassi observes that

> in the rational process we claim that we know something when we are able to prove it. To prove . . . means to show something to be something, on the basis of something. It is clear that the first archai of any proof and hence of knowledge cannot be proved themselves because they cannot be the object of apodictic, demonstrative, logical speech [writing]. The rational process and consequently rational speech must move from the formulation of primary assertions: by using the kind of expression which belongs to

> the nondeducible. . . .[27]

The combination of these solutions portrays rhetoric as a means of inducing decisions and judgments, moving from the relevant facts to some action or disposition regarding those facts.

A successful application of rhetoric, then, supposes the following: (1) a definition of textual authority of a sort that can support and justify action; (2) a definition of textual authority that is not simply the right of actor A to get actor B to carry out A's will voluntarily; and (3) a definition of textual authority which centers itself on actor B's discovery of compelling properties of A when A is a person, a solution to a puzzle, or any alternative in a choice situation. In other words, textual authority is an individual's attraction to the state of affairs offered by an alternative and voluntary choice of that option over others, a radically different perspective than seeing textual authority as either being granted by an outside "force" or somehow residing in a person, office, text, ritual, explanation, justification, reason, or social arrangement.

This view of textual authority as rhetoric further bases itself on the sophistic belief that rather than privileging the truth, a view of rhetoric held by Plato, rhetoric makes its claims come true. It urges judgment in a choice situation, judgment stemming from the manner in

which a person's ethos causes him or her to see an alternative's resources as attractive, judgment which makes textual authority rhetorical. According to Kerford, judgment as rhetoric for the sophists is based on the concepts of probability and timeliness: "When we put together the doctrines of the Probable or Plausible and the Right moment in Time, in relation to Opinion (or what men think or believe), it is clear that we have . . . the elements of a theory of rhetoric."[28] Moreover, the notion of judgment implies a conception of choice. As Grant Webster notes, "at the basis of the creative theorizing which lies behind all normal critical practice, is the element of human choice."[29] Some description of an alternative's possible resources, however, is necessary in order to understand how those resources allow that alternative to be chosen in a judgmental situation.

Alternatives may possess two types of resources that make an individual more likely to chose them. The first of these is the alternative's salience. A salient alternative is more likely to be chosen because the perceiver's expectations converge on it. But for that choice to be made, a context must surround the choice, thereby allowing an alternative's perceptibility to be noticed. Thomas Kuhn's description of the "gestalt shift" explains this context. According to Kuhn, "at times of revolution, when the normal scientific tradition changes, the scientist's

perception of his environment must be re-educated--in some familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt."[30] In other words, a situation in which an individual must make a judgment on competing knowledge claims demands a context in which only a new way of seeing those claims can allow perceptibility to develop. Thus, for Cicero, the situation of a rhetor attempting to make a judge receptive to a claim requires the creation of a "new gestalt" which would allow the judge to apprehend the salience of the rhetor's claim and grant it authority. This is the basis of the De Oratore in which Cicero characterizes the officia oratoris as dependent, in a large fashion, on the ability to "win over those who are listening [reading, judging]."[31]

The nature of salience, however, requires more specific investigation than simply an example based on the Ciceronian rhetorical system, for different attributes of an ethnographic knowledge claim could be used as focal points of a potentially authoritative alternative in an ethnography. For example, George Gmelch, in his study of baseball magic, claims that because the acts of pitching and batting in professional baseball involve the greatest degree of chance, they are therefore the greatest "arenas" for observations of magical rituals, taboos, and fetishes.[32] This claim gains its authority through the attribute of precedence because its audience of

ethnographers recognize as salient the precedence established forty-three years earlier by Bronislaw Malinowski's statement that "we find magic wherever the elements of chance and accident, and the emotional play between hope and fear, have a wide and extensive range."[33]

Similarly, symmetry can function as an attribute of the salience of a system of ethnographic knowledge claims, for the symmetrical system will acquire more authoritative force than will the asymmetrical system. Isocrates's rhetorical system, as detailed in Against the Sophists, emphasizes symmetry as a means of audience attraction within the situation created by the competition for students among the schools of sophistic rhetoric in pre-Socratic Greece. The triadic structure of nature, training, and practice, when contrasted with the "listings" of tricks of argumentation offered by other sophistic schools, attracts a greater authoritative force.[34]

An analogous example is seen in the situation created by the competing knowledge claims offered by ethnographic functionalists and evolutionists. Malinowski's translated relationship between etic and emic data promised a more highly symmetrical and therefore authoritative system of claims when contrasted with systems offered by such evolutionists as Sir James Frazier.[35]

Finally, an ethnographic knowledge claim's prominence, when viewed from the perspective of a particular critical

backdrop, promotes that claim's potential textual authority. Stephen R. Yarbrough observes that claims reflecting Marxist desires to supersede capitalism will attract the authority offered by the Marxist audience, and the same holds for deconstructionist claims attempting to replace structuralist claims.[36] In the same manner, Melford Spiro's claim that an unusually strong Oedipal complex exists in the Trobriand Islands contends with Malinowski's claim that the matrilineal society of the Trobriand Islands produces a complex very different from Freud's.[37] When viewed from the perspective of the psychoanalytic society, however, Spiro's claim's attributes include prominence, and therefore textual authority, for Spiro's Freudian-oriented audience expects a Freudian construct.

Characteristics of salience, therefore, attract an ethnography's reader's attention and direct the choices made between competing knowledge claims. More importantly, the act of choosing confers on the selected claim the notion of textual authority.

Persuasive justifications work in a similar fashion, for an ethnographic knowledge claim's support forms an attribute which increases the claim's potential for attracting a reader's notion of textual authority. Justifiable claims are more likely to be chosen than claims lacking or having weaker substantiation. Moreover, choosing a justified alternative depends on a Kuhnian

"gestalt" which allows the reader to see the force of the justifications and to therefore deem them authoritative. Clifford Geertz, for example, claims that religion, besides providing "harmonizing, integrating, and psychologically supportive aspects, [also promotes] disruptive, disintegrative, and psychologically disturbing aspects."[38] In order for his support to be recognized as an attribute affecting potential authority, a Kuhnian "gestalt" in the form of Ethnographic Idealism must function as a means of allowing Geertz's justifications to be used as attributes for an ethnographic knowledge claim having greater attractiveness than Emile Durkheim's or Bronislaw Malinowski's.[39]

Wayne Booth's statement that the argument itself indicates "<u>whether</u> further attention is 'due,' and . . . finally tells us <u>how</u> we should judge what we find"[40] implies both the idea that justification is an attribute used to attract textual authority and the idea that justification has a describable nature. Returning to Geertz's discourse on the effects of social change on religious ritual illuminates this nature, for within the text Geertz uses justification to create attributes of reliability, universality, and constraint for his claims.

Justifications acquire reliability when they reveal immunity to the pressures of temporary circumstances. Thus, by defining culture as "the fabric of meaning in

terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their action,"[41] Geertz includes within his definition the functionalist emphasis on observable acts ("guided action") while at the same time removing the pressure created by functionalism's tendency to treat ethnographic data as static. Interpreting experience by means of a "fabric of meaning" emphasizes the shifting nature of meanings and their resultant interpretations. Not being sealed within the strictures of a particular situation, the definition of culture creates the sense of reliability and adds to the potential textual authority of Geertz's claim about religion.

Support for an ethnographic knowledge claim may also command the attribute of universality and thus direct a reader's attention and choice when it is easily transferred across different social contexts. Ethnographers have long demanded that etic analyses of cultures be cross-culturally applicable. One result of this demand has been the formation of the Human Relations Area Files, a collection of information organized under eighty-eight categories that are heavily cross-referenced.[42] The authority granted by cultural researchers to these files of data is created by the categories' ability to provide guidance in a wide variety of social circumstances. Clifford Geertz similarly makes use of universal justification by demonstrating that while Javanese religious beliefs

effectively counteract the "centrifugal forces of fear, dismay, [and] demoralization . . . [they also act] against the grain of social equilibrium,"[43] a paradox common, for example, in European and American societies. Thus, Geertz's support for his claim that Durkheimian and Malinowskian functionalist perspectives lack explanatory power, specifically in describing etically the nature of religion, acquires the attribute of universality and, as a result, textual authority.

Finally, justifications which demonstrate an ethnographic knowledge claim's ability to reduce arbitrariness are more likely to be chosen as persuasive by a reader than those that do not. For example, support for a knowledge claim that appeals only to narrow self-interest is purely whimsical and therefore cannot contribute to the claimant's attempt to gain authority. This capricious type of support is the target of Horace Miner's "Body Ritual Among the Nacirema." In his essay, Miner describes the process of medical prescription and the manner in which medicine is obtained by the patient:

> These preparations are secured from a variety of specialized practitioners. The most powerful of these are the medicine men, whose assistance must be rewarded with substantial gifts. However, the medicine men do not provide the curative potions for their clients, but decide what the

> ingredients should be and then write them down in an ancient and secret language. This writing is understood only by the medicine men and by the herbalists who, for another gift, provide the required charms.[44]

Although Miner's description appears to be similar to the justification Geertz supplies for his claim that religious behaviors provide the Javanese with both socially cohesive and socially destructive aspects, Miner intentionally invokes a caricature of etic interpretation. This dehumanized form is characteristic of merely one feature of ethnography, and its emphasis creates an idiosyncratic nature which does nothing to diminish arbitrariness. Geertz, however, by including within his discourse a description of the religious, political, and economic setting of the Javanese village and an emic narration of the funeral proceedings, avoids accusations of narrow self-interest, downgrades the power of opposing (arbitrary) knowledge claims, increases the attractiveness of Geertz's thesis, and augments the potential for textual authority.

Moreover, unless justifications suggest standards against which future justifications can be judged, a sense of arbitrariness remains, something which prevents the ethnographic knowledge claim from attaining textual authority. Thus, in the section labeled "Analysis" of his

treatment of Javanese religion, Geertz makes use of an unexpressed heuristic both as an ordering mechanism and as a means of testing future knowledge claims on cultural and societal effects of religion. Kenneth Burke's notion of logological analysis provides a workable means of examining Geertz's methodology. "What opposes what?" provides a structural framework for detailing the questions pertinent to the schemata created by Durkheim's and Malinowski's and Geertz's hypotheses on religion and its effects on culture and society. For Durkheim, the questions may be consolidated and phrased in this manner: How does religion "select the positive creed, the comforting view, the culturally valuable belief in immortality?"[45] For Malinowski, the questions may be consolidated and phrased in this manner: How does religion give "body and form to the saving beliefs [just as it does] with regard to the whole group?"[46]

On the other hand, the questions for Geertz may be consolidated and phrased in this manner: How does religion represent the "independent roles [of] both culture and social structure?"[47] The arranging power of the first Burkean query depicts Geertz's strategy of juxtaposing the schemata in order to show the "difficult problems" which develop from the application of Durkheim's and Malinowski's hypotheses to the Javanese example: neither can explain fully the fact that "the ritual [was] tearing the

society apart rather than integrating it, [was] disorganizing personalities rather than healing them."[48] Moreover, these "problems" not only cast doubt on future credible employment of Durkheim's and Malinowski's beliefs but also return the reader to the heuristical question which, in turn, forms the means for judging ethnographic knowledge claims on the function of religion: How does the claim and its support explain the relationship between religion and the "discontinuity between the form of integration existing in the social structural dimension and the form of integration existing in the cultural dimension?"[49]

"What derives from what?" follows naturally from the earlier portion of the heuristic, for Geertz's ensuing discourse traces a protrait of a Javanese village seen from this stance:

> Amid a radically more complex social environment, [the Javanese villager] clings noticeably to the symbols which guided him or his parents through life in rural society. And it is this fact which gave rise to the psychological and social tension surrounding [the religious function of the] funeral.[50]

In addition, "What follows what?" provides a third means of testing future ethnographic knowledge claims: How does the claim and its support predict what will be observed in

other societies where religious rituals "remind people that the neighborhood bonds they are strengthening through a dramatic enactment are no longer the bonds which most emphatically hold them together?"[51]

The justifiability of an ethnographic knowledge claim serving as an alternative to a competing knowledge claim rests on an appeal to the reason of a reader. Alexander McKelway notes this relationship, as well as the relationship between reason and textual authority, saying textual authority "represents a legitimate aspect of reason. . . . It tries to speak in the name of being and reason, and therefore speaks in an unconditional and ultimate way."[52] More importantly, McKelway characterizes the nature of a reader who, through his or her choice of an ethnographic knowledge claim in competition with another, grant textual authority--this is a reader verbally active within the ethnographic field in which claims are offered as alternatives to previously existing claims, a reader clearly perceiving him or herself as a "being" with the power to grant textual authority. This is the reader portrayed by Michael Overington when he states, "The practice of scientific inquiry depends . . . on the acquiescence of individual scientists in the consensual agreement on norms, standards, rhetoric, problems, solutions, judgments, and the like, which provide for the continuing recreation of a scientific consensus out of the skepticism of research."[53]

Seeing textual authority as an important part of the rhetorical operations of such a reader provides a means of examining the process by which competing ethnographic knowledge claims either fall by the wayside or develop into Kuhnian paradigms which, in turn, give rise to new claims. Further, seeing textual authority in such a light permits answers to the questions posed earlier in this chapter. First, ethnographic discourse is neither imbued with nor reflective of a sense of textual authority since textual authority is a reader-centered quality by means of which competing ethnographic knowledge claims are differentiated so that one may be chosen on the basis of its attributes of salience and justifiability. Second, an ethnographer can neither lose nor gain textual authority since textual authority does not reside in him or her, nor in the claims and support making up the text. Rather, the claims are perceived as textually authoritative by a reader who has chosen these claims over others in the context of a continually recreating field of inquiry. Third, persuasion, through the ethnographer's development of the attributes of salience and justifiability, is used to motivate a reader's choice of a particular knowledge claim and thus view that claim as textually authoritative. This system involving ethnographer and reader, however, is not necessarily closed; alternative knowledge claims may, by means of more highly attractive attributes, be seen as

being more authoritative than previous claims, resulting in increasing acts of inquiry and eventually constructions of paradigms. One possible method of making these alternative claims conspicuous and stimulating inquiry might be through ethnographic use of Derrida's notion of the "narrative allegory."[54] By dramatizing or enacting the truth inherent in the cultural events observed, perhaps through visual media such as film, computer applications such as Hypertext, or through text such as William Faulkner's Sound and the Fury in which multiple perspectives of an event are balanced against each other, the material of the signifiers might be favored over the meanings of the signifieds. In this fashion, the view of readers as rational actors, who make choices of knowledge claims on the basis of attributes of salience and justifiability in the context of a continually recreated field of inquiry and through those choices grant authority, might be emphasized. In addition, other stories beyond those sanctioned by "official" ethnography might be told.

Notes

[1] Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983) 46.

[2] Plato, Phaedrus, trans. W. C. Helmbold and W. G. Rabinowitz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Educational Publishing, 1985) 272.

[3] David Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1957) 67.

[4] Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida, and Writing (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988) 52.

[5] Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 238.

[6] Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1932) 9.

[7] George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: The U of North Carolina P, 1980) 10.

[8] Kennedy 122.

[9] Kennedy 151.

[10] Edward P.J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 1971) 138.

[11] Leonard Krieger, "The Idea of Authority in the West," American Historical Review 82 (1977): 250.

[12] Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987) 52.

[13] Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) 218.

[14] Corbett 137.

[15] Kennedy 10.

[16] Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: U of California P, 1969) 40-42.

[17] Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 110.

[18] Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley: The U of California P, 1970) 203.

[19] Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979) 224.

[20] Grant Webster, The Republic of Letters: A History of Postwar American Literary Opinion (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1979) 10.

[21] Richard Rorty, "Science as Solidarity," The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs, eds. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey (Madison: The U of Wisconsin P, 1987) 42.

[22] G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981) 74.

[23] Aristotle 7.

[24] Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy (University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1980) 65.

[25] Kerferd 78.

[26] Aristotle 5-6.

[27] Grassi 64-65.

[28] Kerferd 82.

[29] Webster 12.

[30] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1970) 12.

[31] Kennedy 100.

[32] George J. Gmelch, "Baseball Magic," Transaction 8 (1971): 39.

[33] Bronislaw Malinowski, Coral Gardens and Their Magic (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935) 10.

[34] Kennedy 32.

[35] See Sir James Frazier, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955).

[36] Stephen R. Yarbrough, "Differance, Deference, and the Question of Proper Reading," Man and World 20 (1987): 280.

[37] Melford E. Spiro, Oedipus in the Trobriands (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982) 1-11.

[38] Geertz 143.

[39] See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1947) and Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948).

[40] Booth 225.

[41] Geertz 145.

[42] See George P. Murdock, Outline of Cultural Materialism (New Haven: HRAF, 1961).

[43] Geertz 163, 168.

[44] Horace Miner, "Body Ritual Among the Nacirema," American Anthropologist 58 (1956): 504.

[45] Geertz 163.

[46] Geertz 163.

[47] Geertz 163.

[48] Geertz 163.

[49] Geertz 164.

[50] Geertz 165.

[51] Geertz 169.

[52] Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1965) 76.

[53] Michael A. Overington, "The Scientific Community as Audience: Toward a Rhetorical Analysis of Science," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (Summer 1977): 145-46.

[54] Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 296.

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